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United States Trade Policy at 
the Crossroads 
Jagdish N .  Bhagwati 
HE popular perception, and the objective reality, of United States trade 
policy is that it is in a state of flux; indeed, it may have taken a turn for the 
worse. * 
It is not just that the Administration of the United States has succumbed to 
mounting demands for protection against imports by negotiating a number of 
significant export restraints. Nor is it that the ‘unfair trade’ provisions in Ameri- 
can law for taking anti-dumping actions and levying subsidy-countervailing duties 
have been captured and misused by protectionists2 - even though less, perhaps, 
than in the European Community. 
What is most disturbing is the weakened commitment of the United States to 
multilateralism, manifesting itself in a variety of new ways. The evidence of a 
fundamental change in trade policy is the new interest in regional arrangements 
and the departure from the accepted way of ‘doing business’ under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by asserting that demands can be made 
for unilateral trade concessions by others and enforced by threats of retaliation. 
NEW DIRECTIONS: ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL 
The origins of some of the changes can be traced back to the Trade Act of 1974 
(which reflected, infer uliu, the trade concerns arising from the weakness of the 
American dollar before the collapse of the Bretton Woods system).4 But the 
dramatic events that have marked a turning point in American trade policy are 
more recent. Two merit mention. 
The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, finally approved by the two 
countries in 1988, was a significant event. It had been preceded by the free trade 
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agreement with Israel, but the special relationship the United States has with 
Israel, given their constituencies, made that an event of little predictive value. The 
free trade agreement with Canada is a different matter altogether, representing a 
conscious reversal of policy not to exploit the GATT’s Article XXIV, which 
provides for departures from the principle of non-discrimination to form free trade 
areas or customs unions, It signalled that regionalism, or plurilateralism (as 
distinct from unconditional most-favoured-nation [MFNI treatment), was now 
okay for the United States to pursue.’ The coincidence with the move by the 
European Community to complete its internal market by the end of 1992 has led, 
in turn, to widespread fears that multilateralism is coming to an end - one 
symptom of which was Lester Thurow ’s celebrated Davos pronouncement, 
‘GATT is dead’.6 
The other significant event was the passage by the United States Congress of the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 - in the face of strenuous 
resistance by the Administration to certain of its provisions. Better called the 
Ominous Act of 1988, this piece of legislation tightened, in various ways, the 
‘unfair trade’ laws of the United States with respect to anti-dumping actions and 
subsidy-countervailing duties. 
What has attracted most attention, however, is the extension of Section 301 of 
the Trade Act of 1974 to create a blunt instrument of trade policy. Section 301 had 
been used, until then, mainly to remedy treaty-defined ‘unfair trade practices’, 
determined as such under multilateral procedures when GATT obligations were in 
question. It has now been turned into a ‘crowbar’ that could, with the aid of 
threatened tariff retaliation, pry open foreign markets determined by the United 
States to be closed to its exports and could be used, also, to remove foreign ‘unfair 
trade’ practices, not defined as such by any treaty whatsoever but determined by 
the United States to be ‘unreasonable’ and impacting adversely on its trade. ’ 
Thus with one unhappy passage of legislation, the United States Congress has 
given legitimacy to unilateralism in defining America’s trade rights, in determin- 
ing their violation and in meting out punishment to secure satisfaction. This 
marked a departure from key principles that the GATT reflects: in particular, that 
trade rights are defined by, and are available to, all GATT member countries and 
all GATT member countries subject themselves to the same dispute-settlement 
procedures over alleged violations of those trade rights. 
The 1988 Act has also marked a departure from the conventional GATT 
approach of ‘first difference’ reciprocity in bargaining over ‘concessions’ in 
multilateral trade negotiations. In place of ‘balanced’ mutual reductions of 
barriers to trade, as in seven rounds of GATT negotiations since 1947, the United 
States Congress appears now to have embraced a novel method of moving to freer 
trade in particular situations: ask others to liberalize using not the inducement of 
one’s own trade concessions but the threat to suspend one’s trading obligations if 
the demands are not met. 
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This is the approach of the so-called ‘Super-301’ provisions of the 1988 Act 
(actually set out in Section 310). It is an approach that has caused much 
consternation, both among domestic critics and foreign countries. It permits, at the 
end of a mandated course of actions, entire countries - not just individual 
industries, as under Section 301 of the 1974 Act - to be castigated as unfair 
traders. Initially, the Super-301 provision requires the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) to identify, in practice on the basis of a survey of 34 
countries and two trading blocs, foreign trade practices whose elimination is likely 
to increase American exports significantly. The process thus results initially in the 
identification of ‘priority’ practices and ‘priority’ countries. 
On 25 May 1989 the first stages of the process reached a climax when, 
following the USTR’s report, President Bush named Brazil, India and Japan as 
‘priority countries’ and specified five areas of ‘priority practices’ that would be 
investigated further. The different stages will now face other mandatory dead- 
lines. If, after twelve to eighteen months of investigation and negotiation (where 
agreed by the named countries), the USTR finds the ‘priority practices’ to be 
‘unfair’, the United States may take retaliatory action. The result of all of this has 
been an electrifying recognition of a definite shift in the trade policy of the United 
States. 
What could be a final blow is threatened by the vociferous proponents of 
‘managed trade’. Their major policy initiative was a report submitted on 10 
February 1989 by the President’s Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations. 
Focusing on Japan, the report asked for a ‘results-oriented’ trade policy, thus 
opting for what I have called a ‘fix-quantity’ regime, by contrast to the ‘fix-rules’ 
regime that the GATT represents. 
The popularity of the report on Capitol Hill and the fact that it represents the 
sentiments and policy views of an influential set of chief executives in the 
American business community are causes for concern. So were early reports of 
approbation by Carla Hills, the United States Trade Representative in President 
Bush’s Cabinet, which were subsequently denied and attributed to erroneous 
reporting. It is an open and disturbing question whether, in fact, ‘managed trade’ 
will sneak its way into United States trade policy, past Ambassador Hills’s 
emphatic rejection, by judging the ‘good behaviour’ of Japan and other targeted 
countries by ‘how much’ they import - and how much of it is imported from the 
United States and from particular American industries. 
These changes in the trade policy of the United States coexist with the 
undoubted and considerable commitment of the Administration to the success of 
multilateral efforts, in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 
Geneva, to liberalize agricultural trade and trade in services as well as extend 
GATT rules to other ‘new areas’. 
American trade policy therefore presents two faces. But with governments 
which are not monolithic that is not a sign of schizophrenia. In the case of the 
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United States, the multilateral initiatives are essentially those of the Administra- 
tion, while the shifts to unilateralism have been driven by the Congress. The latter 
reflect, in turn, a variety of forces, among them lobbying pressure from consti- 
tuencies and, too, the appeal of diverse arguments that seem to provide plausibility 
to the notion that America deserves unilateral trade concessions from her trading 
rivals, extracted if necessary by threats of tariff retaliation. 
In the rest of this article, I therefore consider, in the next section, the general 
factors that have prompted the shifts in United States trade policy. In the third 
section, I consider the many arguments that are in currency, implicitly or 
explicitly, to justify the demands for unilateral reductions of trade barriers by 
others. Next I examine the appropriateness of the Section-301 and Super-301 
methods used to extract those unilateral concessions. I conclude briefly with the 
questions of ‘managed trade’ and regionalism. 
FORCES UNDERLYING THE SHIFTS IN UNITED STATES 
TRADE POLICY 
In understanding the new embrace of regional initiatives and aggressive uni- 
lateralism in opening foreign markets, and in seeking the removal of foreign trade 
practices considered unilaterally to be unreasonable and hence unfair, it is 
important to appreciate the critical role played by the acceleration of import 
protectionism during the first term of the Reagan Administration. ’ 
The increased demands for import protection that swged in the United States 
Congress were not the run-of-the-mill kind that arise from time to time as random 
pressures on specific industries from imports and are translated in the political 
arena into demands for relief from foreign competition. They were over a much 
wider spectrum of industries. Their potency derived not merely from the pressure 
of constituents, reflecting secrional interests, but from the increasing sense in the 
Congress that the social good required support for troubled industries. Let me 
elaborate. 
The Balance of Payments 
1. The over-valuation of the American dollar put significant pressure for 
adjustment in the traded activities of the American economy - making non-traded 
activities generally more profitable at the expense of the traded ones. 
Mounting constituency pressure for relief from imports was an inevitable 
political outcome. It was handled inaptly by the Administration during the first 
Reagan term. Until the Plaza Agreement, the appreciation of the dollar was 
regarded with indifference, seen simply as a consequence of the attractiveness of 
the American economy for foreign investable funds. The possibility that there 
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could be, even in that case, serious adjustment problems imposed on the economy 
- as with the ‘Dutch disease’ problem - because of the magnitude of the 
resource reallocation required was not addressed. 
The ‘high-track’ export restraints that followed were thrown as crumbs to 
satisfy protectionist demands. But the crumbs turned into loaves, marring the 
free-trade image, and also the track record, that the Reagan Administration 
wanted. l o  
2. But the ‘balance-of-payments’ situation, in the shape of the trade deficit that 
persisted in spite of the significant post-Plaza realignment of the dollar, fostered a 
growing feeling that the trade deficit was unsustainable, had to be eliminated and 
could not be tackled by exchange-rate realignment. The broader American 
interest required, therefore, that trade policy had to be deployed to address the 
trade deficit. 
It is true that the unsustainability of the trade deficit and its elimination as a goal 
for the United States (whether in its own interest or that of countries ‘more in need 
of capital’) are issues that are arguable, to say the least, and have been argued 
extensively. But the notion that exchange-rate changes cannot impact any more on 
the trade deficit has drawn somewhat greater strength from the empirical observa- 
tion that the realignment of the dollar failed to reduce the trade deficit anywhere 
near as quickly and as much as many had hoped. It accordingly needs commenting 
upon. Two points should be made. 
First, a clichC, but an important one. If excess spending continues, expenditure- 
switching policies, such as exchange-rate devaluations, will fail to produce more 
than ripple effects on the trade deficit. ‘ I  if the budget deficit persisted, and no 
significant reduction in spending occurred in the private sector, the realignment of 
the dollar could not be expected to work. 
Second, a novel consideration. If local prices do not rise, a devaluation cannot 
induce a switch of expenditure away from imports. Much was made, in the early 
years after the Plaza Agreement, of the failure of the ‘pass-through’ effects of the 
currency realignment. Prices of imported goods did not rise by the amount of the 
dollar devaluation or, at least, not as much as ‘normal’. A search for explanations 
started among macro-economists. The more interesting among them was the 
notion that investments, once made, would lead to price-setting behaviour to hold 
onto markets. Japanese firms, having invested in the high dollar for sales in 
American markets, would tenaciously cut prices when the dollar fell, rather than 
close down and move out. This notion of ‘hysteresis’, and lack of symmetry 
around a change back and forth, may have some merit insofar as the dollar was 
high for a long period and investors may not have foreseen the magnitude of the 
dollar’s fall. ’* 
But a natural and plausible explanation, pertinent to the discussion of trade 
policy, is one that the macro-economists forgot to note, perhaps because their 
conventional thinking had not caught up with the way non-tariff measures are used 
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in developed countries generally and in the United States in particular to deal with 
‘disruptive’ imports. l 3  This was simply that, as the dollar had long remained high, 
Japanese (and Far Eastern) exports had come to be heavily afflicted by export- 
restraint arrangements in various forms. This meant that there was often a 
substantial scarcity premium on Japanese goods. If the dollar was devalued, the 
devaluation would first cut into this premium, with the final price to American 
consumers unaffected. Only after the devaluation had exceeded this premium 
would an impact on final prices be seen. That is to say, the pass-through effects 
would be abnormally low at the outset, until the premia were absorbed. I 4  
That this hypothesis has explanatory power is supported by the facts that 
Japanese goods were heavily restrained, that the dollar was devalued mainly 
against the yen and that the pass-through effects improved after the dollar 
devaluation had become substantial. But it is additionally supported by disaggre- 
gated industry studies undertaken in Japan. l 5  
By ignoring the linkage between protection and exchange-rate inefficacy, 
analysts have encouraged the erroneous idea that protection is necessary because 
exchange-rate changes are ineffective. We are in danger, then, of experiencing a 
vicious circle: protection leads to the reduced efficacy of exchange-rate changes; 
in turn, the inefficacy of exchange-rate changes leads to protection. 
But it is also necessary to remind politicians that if they think exchange-rate 
changes are inefficacious because ‘prices no longer matter’, the same objection 
could apply to protection. Both are expenditure-switching policies (although they 
are not identical insofar as the exchange-rate change affects exports as well). In 
addition, neither policy can work unless it differentially affects domestic savings 
and investment, so as to produce an excess of the former over the latter at the 
margin. I 6  Otherwise a lasting impact on the trade deficit is not possible. 
The Double Squeeze 
The adjustment problem for the traded industries in the United States has been 
further accentuated by a ‘double squeeze’. The growth of exports from Japan 
and the Pacific ‘Gang of Four’ (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) 
and the less spectacular but still impressive export performance of other newly 
industrializing countries, such as Brazil, and of the newly exporting countries, 
such as Malaysia and Thailand, have created problems for specific industries in 
the developed countries, obliging them to adjust to those changes. 
A country that grows more rapidly than others will, on average, export at a 
volume and rate of growth that is hard for the other countries to accommodate 
without complaints from the domestic industries that must bear the brunt of the 
adjustment. Japan has been up against this phenomenon since the 1930s. Even 
then, when Japan was not yet dominant, Japanese diplomats were scurrying 
around negotiating ‘voluntary’ export restraints - on pencils, electric lamps, 
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safety matches and other products - with the United States, Britain, Australia and 
other trading partners, partners among whom a bilateral surplus in trade with 
Japan was common. The present surplus situation has compounded Japan’s 
difficulties; but even if her surplus were to disappear, she would continue to attract 
the protectionist ire of disaffected competitors. l 9  
De-industrialization and National Interest 
The protectionist fall-out , however, has come not merely from troubled indus- 
tries seeking relief. There has been the national-interest concern that America is 
threatened with de-industrialization and that this, in turn, will damage the 
economic well-being of the United States. 
The Democrats, in particular, fell easy prey to these views. For instance, in the 
1984 Presidential election campaign in the United States, the Democratic candi- 
date Walter Mondale invoked images of Americans reduced to flipping hambur- 
gers at McDonalds while the Japanese overwhelmed the country’s industries. He 
might have invoked, with greater irony, a picture of American kids rolling rice 
cakes at sushi bars. 
The fear of de-industrialization also agitated the leaders of trade unions in 
declining, protection-seeking industries. Sol Chaikin, for example, of the Inter- 
national Garment Workers’ Union, protested in an article in Foreign Affairs: 
‘Because there are relatively few well-paying jobs in the services sector, an 
economy devoid of manufacturing would also necessarily experience a general 
decline of living standards. . . Unrestricted trade and the investment practices of 
the multinationals . . . can only lead to an America ultimately devoid of manufac- 
turing.’ *’ 
The effect was to make life easier for those seeking protection. These views 
made it less difficult for politicians to respond ahmatively to narrower interests 
seeking protection. Congressmen voting for protection could feel comfortable in 
their conviction that they were acting, not as politicians responding to the narrow 
sectional interests of their constituents, but as slatesmen safeguarding the national 
interest. 
From an objective point of view, however, the arguments advanced in support 
of the view that de-industrialization has deleterious consequences are sufficiently 
tenuous to make the recent ‘manufacturing matters’ school of worriers in the 
United States as hard to side with as the members of the better-known and earlier 
school of de-industrialization in the United Kingdom, led by the late Nicholas 
Kaldor, the distinguished Cambridge economist and intellectual of the Labour 
Party. *’ Let me address some of the principal arguments of the two schools. 
Some contend that manufacturing plays an ‘integral role’ in the American 
economy in the shape of ‘important linkages to the broader economy’.22 But 
linkages in the shape of input-output relationships reveal nothing about the 
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desirability of policy intervention to correct market failure. It is commonplace 
among non-economists to infer externalities from linkages. It is also a common 
non sequitur. 2 3  
It is often said that because American manufactures ‘constitute a significant 
source of demand for the output of other industries’, an increase in manufacturing 
unemployment would create increased unemployment in other related industries 24  
and, therefore, manufactures must be supported. But that is an argument which 
can be easily turned on its head. Would it not be sensible to reduce the size of an 
industry that can cause such sizeable disruption? Besides, even accepting the form 
of the argument, one must build a plausible counter-factual to judge the matter. If 
manufactures go down, what goes up; and what then would be the new linkages? 
Furthermore, the notion that services are complementary to manufactures has 
been used to argue that the promotion or defence, at a minimum, of manufactures 
is essential. The collapse of one would lead not to a ‘post-industrial’ service 
economy but to something else (presumably more primitive, instead of progress- 
ive and pleasurable). Now let me quote from the chief proponents of this view 
(peculiar to the American school and, to my knowledge, foreign to the British 
school’s way of thinking which saw manufactures as being a substitute to 
services): 
‘There are . . . linkages in the economy, such as those which tie the crop 
duster to the cotton fields, the ketchup maker to the tomato patch, the wine 
press to the vineyards (to return our focus on agriculture). Here the linkages 
are tight and quite concrete. . . Beyond the limit of possible recorn- 
mendations provided by the bounded space, the linkage is a bind, not a 
junction or substitution point. OfSshore the tomato farm and yoci close or 
oflshore the ketchup plant. No two ways about it’ (emphasis added). 2 s  
When I first read this assertion, as I remarked in my Ohlin Lectures, I was eating 
my favourite Crabtree & Evelyn marmalade and had not realized that England 
grew her own oranges! 2 6  
Similar arguments have come from other proponents of manufactures. For 
instance: 2 7  
‘. . . many industries that feature prominently in visions of the “post- 
industrial” economy, such as education, banking and communications, are 
demanded in significant part by the manufacturing sector. The health of these 
progressive parts of the services sector is therefore tied to the performance of 
American manufacturing firms. ’ 
This statement confuses linkages with physical proximity or, at least, national 
production of producer services. But linkages in most modern services need not be 
either. Thanks to technical change, many modern services can now be delivered 
without the physical proximity of the supplier to the user: many are what are now 
called ‘disembodied’ or, better still, ‘long-distance’ services which can be 
delivered over the wire.28 Technical change has greatly reduced the degree of 
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local establishment necessary to deliver services to users even when efficient 
supply requires physical proximity. The assumption that there is a strong physical- 
proximity linkage which makes it impossible to supply producer services to 
manufacturing establishments elsewhere was never wholly true. Now it is almost 
fanciful. It derives almost certainly from an archaic haircuts-as-services conception 
of the services sector. 
Turning, then, to more serious arguments for favouring the manufacturing 
sector, one must reckon with the different claims - implicit and explicit - of 
market failure. A particularly appealing one has resulted from the recent develop- 
ments in the theory of trade in imperfectly competitive product markets. With 
sufficiently large economies internal to the firm, oligopolistic market structures can 
emerge. It follows that prices will generally not measure true costs, that excess 
profits will emerge and that intervention in support of one’s own industry can shift 
some excess profits away from foreign firms towards the domestic industry in 
question. 2 9  
These notions are scientifically interesting and have attracted well-deserved 
attention. But if they are used to support the promotion of manufactures, as has 
often been the case in Washington, it is necessary to note several compelling 
objections. 
(a) The profit-shifting argument has a predatory flavour. It can therefore 
lead to retaliation. Once that happens, everyone can be a loser. Certainly, the 
world trading regime would be a loser. Trade battles, even when settled, can 
leave scars, making it easier for protectionists to achieve their self-serving 
goals. 
(b) What is more, the argument pre-supposes that there are in fact signifi- 
cant rents to shift, but recent empirical analysis suggests that this is not so. 30 
(c) The question of sizeable increasing returns to scale to the firm can also 
be investigated empirically. Here again, the latest econometric findings for 
American and European industry indicate that there is very little evidence of 
internal economies even at the ‘two-digit’ level of industries, leaving one to 
wonder whether they exist in a significant degree at the level of individual 
firms. ’‘ 
(d) Finally, if a special case is to be made for favouring manufactures 
because of the ‘strategic’ profit-sharing theory, it is pertinent to note that some 
in developing countries currently cite that very theory to say that modern 
services are characterized by substantial economies of scale and hence freer 
trade in services should be rejected. Obviously, there is no shortage of 
pressure groups who want protection and no shortage, either, of theoretical 
‘beneficial-protection’ arguments that pressure groups will embrace (without 
detailed empirical justification) to further their cause. In any event, it is 
inconsistent for the makers of trade policy in the developed countries to use 
notions of ‘strategic’ trade policy (based on economies-of-scale arguments) to 
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pursue their own goals while denying them to the developing countries whom 
they castigate as ‘obstructionist’ in negotiating an agreement on trade in 
services. Must economies-of-scale arguments be used only by those with 
scale (in terms of political power)? 
Now for the overriding question of externalities. Do manufactures just have sex 
appeal to those who have never been close to a blast furnace or do they have 
unusual externalities, giving differentially more to us than they take from the 
national pie? 
Externalities are a phenomenon that many economists feel must exist and may 
even be important. Serendipity and the fact that its rewards are not generally 
appropriable by those who act as catalysts testify to the belief that we are talking 
about something tangible. But it is so hard to identify the differential significance 
of externalities within speci$c activities that many economists have tended to walk 
away from the concept for policy-making purposes, arguing that they are the last 
refuge of the scoundrel seeking special favours, perhaps even the first refuge. 3 2  
By contrast, politicians have little trouble deciding what sector or industry has 
unusual externalities and, as a result, is important to defend and even expand. 
Manufactures have been the beneficiaries of their attention in developing countries 
and from the members of the British and American de-industrialization schools. 
So have, of late, high-technology industries where politicians believe that having 
them must be important for the economy because they are at the forefront of 
modern technology. 3 3  
It is difficult to find sufficiently convincing evidence to support the case for 
promoting manufactures, or specific components thereof like high-technology 
industries, on grounds of unusual externalities. Something can be said, though. 
1.  The econometric studies cited as showing that internal economies of scale are 
not important in American (and European) industries also show that external 
economies are important. These external economies are further related to the 
overall size of the manufacturing sector. 3 4  But the authors could equally have used 
the overall size of the economy or the size of the manufacturing sector plus the 
modern financial sector and turned up the same result. (I have urged them to test 
the hypothesis in view of the significance of these distinctions for the current 
policy debate on the consequences of de-industrialization.) 35 
2. Does the fact that manufactures show a higher rate of increase in labour 
productivity than others indicate that they must be supported? This was the view 
implied in the so-called ‘Verdoorn Law’ that led Kaldor to recommend the 
‘selective employment tax’ in the United Kingdom to tax employment in services 
and thus make hiring cheaper for manufactures. Kaldor was careful to imply, 
however, that there was an externality here, that some sort of ‘learning by doing’ 
operated in manufacturing. 36 The mere fact of a higher increase in productivity in 
a sector is in itself not an argument for policy intervention to support the sector. To 
my knowledge, the British debate on Kaldor’s thesis did not produce any 
UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY 449 
compelling evidence that manufactures were characterized by a significant amount 
of such implied ‘learning by doing’ or other externality and that the amount was 
sufficiently higher than in other sectors (such as modern services) to warrant 
differential support of manufactures. 3 7  
3 .  Yet another argument, used in the American debate, has been that the 
manufacturing sector accounts for over 90 per cent of research-and-development 
(R&D) expenditures in the United States. This cannot be an argument though for 
supporting manufactures against a market-induced decline unless it is shown that 
the social rate of return on this research-and-development expenditure exceeds 
that on other capital spending. Again, one cannot really argue without further 
analysis that, no matter why and therefore where this sector shrinks in terms of 
industry-wise and firm-wise composition, R&D expenditures will shrink too. 
Maybe the shrinking will take place in firms which do not undertake research and 
development; it would in fact seem plausible that the R&D-intensive firms will be 
larger and, if import competition is causing the shrinkage, the firms that exit will 
be those that are smaller and not engaged in research and development. Thus even 
this version of the ‘productivity’ argument for manufactures remains unproven. 
4. Another argument is that for small (‘infinitesimal’) changes, a subsidy to 
manufactures will produce a negligible (‘second-order’) loss if manufactures do 
not have externalities, but that if they do the gain will be non-negligible (‘first- 
order’). Given equal ignorance, one should then subsidize manufactures. 3 8  But 
there are problems with this argument. (i)  Interventions are not infinitesimal. (ii) 
The argument further pre-supposes that the world is efficient except for the 
possible externality in manufactures. (iii) The argument may be equally applied to 
modern services, in which case the subsidizing of manufactures may do more 
harm than good. (iv) Even within manufactures, it is highly unlikely that externali- 
ties obtain for all manufactures: even an infinitesimal across-the-board subsidy to 
all of them can then produce a net loss. 
Finally, mention must be made of the interesting recent revival in the United 
States of the argument, originally considered relevant to developing countries, 
that manufactures have to pay excess wages for identical labour, these excess 
wages representing a distortion that requires appropriate intervention to support 
manufactures. 3 9  I find this personally satisfying since the argument was first 
developed by trade theorists in the 1960s and directly led to the major scientific 
developments in the theory of commercial policy during the post-war period. 40 It 
serves therefore an incidental but important purpose in refuting the claims 
sometimes made that, until the arrival in the 1980s of the theory of trade in 
imperfectly competitive product markets, free trade was regarded as the policy 
that ‘economic theory tells us is always right’. 4 1  I nevertheless remain sceptical. 
Why? 
I .  It may well be that, even if all of the excess wage rates in an industry were 
treated as reflecting a distortion, it may not do more than dent the cost of existing 
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trade restrictions on manufactured imports. Thus a recent study of the welfare and 
employment effects of United States import quotas on steel and automobiles 
concludes that the benefit of removing the quotas, in the presence of wage 
distortions, continues to be large, although diminished. 4 2  In short, for the United 
States, the degree of protection of key manufactures that may be justified as a 
second-best intervention to offset the maximal possible distortion from excess 
wage rates paid in these sectors appears to be well below what exists. 
2. But the real problem, in my view, is that the interpretation of the wage 
differentials as distortionary is not yet robust enough, in spite of the enormous and 
systematic analysis of the issue. The degree of disaggregation for both industries 
and occupations is much too high - although large by conventional standards - 
to support the conclusions derived if the purpose is to provide actual policy support 
to industries and sectors with distortionary excess wages. Since the particular 
theory of wage distortions which Lawrence Summers et al. favour is that of 
efficiency wages needing to be paid to avoid shirking,43 it would be useful if 
careful and extremely disaggregated micro-economic studies were produced, at 
least for an excess-wage-ranked pair of industries, showing that indeed shirking 
explains the wage differential. I am particularly concerned because, a priori, it 
would seem to me that shirking on the job should be a lot easier in service 
industries such as banking and insurance than in assembly-line manufacturing 
where shirking by an individual may show up immediately in disruption of the 
process. Yet the deviation of the wage from the all-industry average, adjusted for 
variables such as age, experience and schooling, is +9.7 per cent for manufac- 
tures and - 13.2 per cent for finance, insurance and real estate. 44 
3. There is a puzzle in that the inter-industry wage differentials are similar for 
different classes of occupations: ‘The industry wage structure also seems to be 
similar for different types of workers. In industries in which one occupation is 
highly paid, all occupations tend to be highly paid.’45 But it seems highly doubtful 
that technological differences between every pair of industries would make 
everyone, whatever their level of occupation, shirk more in one industry than in 
the other. Can it not be that here we are catching something else altogether - 
possibly, the cost of living in different regions or the cost of labour migration to 
different regions and geographical-specificity of different industries? For 
example, all Englishmen going to India in the nineteenth century, regardless of 
occupational level, would have had to be paid a ‘tropical’ premium, a wage 
differential. 
In short, it seems premature to make recommendations for sectoral-policy 
interventions on the basis of the empirical evidence available. If we are going to 
intervene selectively in favour of industries and sectors, especially when we know 
that selective interventions of this type cannot be insulated from capture and 
misuse, the standard of persuasion if not proof that we should expect greatly 
exceeds what we have before us. The jury is still out. 
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The ‘Diminished Giant’ Syndrome 
The payments difficulties and the ‘double jeopardy’ phenomenon may have 
produced the conditions for increased demand by sectional interests lobbying for 
protection and for increased supply by influential Congressmen thinking that 
protection would also be in the national interest. But the overall ethos favourable 
to protectionism came from the national psychology produced by America’s 
relative decline in the world economy. This might be called the ‘diminished giant’ 
syndrome. 
While the United States continues to be a dominant power, it has witnessed the 
erosion of its predominant status in the world economy as Japan has risen from the 
ashes and, too, as other Pacific countries have come to the fore. 
The parallel with Britain at the end of the nineteenth century is dramatic. In both 
instances, the giant’s diminution produced a protectionist backlash, sorely trying the 
pro-trade bias of the international regime. 46  Walter Lippmann characterized this as 
the American Century. In the same vein, the nineteenth century was Britain’s. As 
the century ended, Britain was gradually losing her political and economic pre- 
eminence. The twentieth century is ending similarly for the United States. Staffan 
Burenstam Linder has already announced the arrival of the Pacific Century. 4 7  
The diminution in Britain’s preeminence in the world economy led to a rise in 
protectionist sentiments and to demands for an end to Britain’s unilateralist 
embrace of free-trade principles. And the United States has followed the same 
path. The present-day sentiments on trade policy in the United States have been 
aimed pointedly at the newly successful rivals, just as their nineteenth-century 
British counterparts were. The United States and Germany were to Britain what 
the Pacific nations - Japan in particular - are to the United States today. 
‘Fair Trade ’ and ‘Level Playing Fields ’ 
Aside, though, from aiding the rise of old-fashioned import protectionism, the 
diminished-giant syndrome has prompted a significant shift in United States trade 
policy towards emphasis on ‘fair trade’. One can argue cynically that words 
matter, as Orwell taught us, and it is easier to indulge protectionism if it is sold as a 
response to ‘unfair trade’ rather than undisguised in its true form. The emergence, 
or re-emergence, of the ‘fair trade’ obsession in the United States grew as import 
competition grew with the rise of the dollar; and the growth of Far East trade can 
certainly be explained partly in such terms. 
But the diminished-giant syndrome also helped. It is relatively easy, when one’s 
premier status is in jeopardy, to think that the success of one’s rivals must be due to 
perfidy. Panic produces petulance. 4 8  The persistent and pervasive belief that the 
countries in the Far East are ‘not playing by the rules’, and that ‘level playing 
fields’ must be established to compete with them, owes much to this syndrome. 
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In fact, ‘fair trade’ and ‘reciprocity’ emerged as issues in an equal degree in 
Britain when she faced her own relative decline at the end of the nineteenth 
century. The rise in Britain during the 1870s and 1880s of the National Fair Trade 
League, the National Society for the Defence of British Industry and the Recipro- 
city Free Trade Association are events that make the American sentiments and 
actions of the last decade more easy to comprehend. 4 9  
Growth of Export Interests 
Apart from the emergence of concerns over unfair trade, the other dramatic 
change, and indeed a novelty in the political economy of trade policy generally, 
has been the growth of export interests in the United States. 5 0  This has given a 
special form, and a sharp edge, to the concerns over unfair trade and to the 
unilateralism that afflicts American trade policy today, while also explaining the 
embrace of regionalism and the thrust of positions adopted by the United States in 
the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Natural Forces - Interests and Ideology: The increasing globalization of 
economic activity, with the criss-crossing of investments among the major trading 
countries, has created a ‘spider’s web’ phenomenon. The reaction of multinational 
enterprises (with global reach) to import pressures does not need to be the 
old-fashioned demand for import protection. This can, by spreading protection 
elsewhere and thereby affecting freer trade in the world economy, imperil the 
open trading system within which they can function best. 
They now have another option. If they sell in other markets, as most do, they 
can also ease the pressure of competition on themselves by asking for, not higher 
import barriers against others, but lower import barriers by others. Aside from 
this providing an option that may equally relieve competitive pressures, it is also in 
keeping with the general multinational ethos and interests of achieving a freer 
worid trading regime. 
It has the added advantage that one might be able to fit it into the ‘unfair trade’ 
framework, if applied at the level of products, firms and industries (as necessary to 
one’s argument). If protection against American exports of automobiles in a 
particular country is greater than American protection against that country’s 
exports of automobiles, that leads to a plausible claim of ‘unfair’ competition. 
Ideologically, this argument may also be shown to have support from trade 
theory on grounds of efficacy, not just fairness. International trade theorists have 
argued that, under large-enough scale economies to a firm, import protection can 
lead to the viability of one’s firm at the expense of one’s rivals, producing even the 
paradoxical phenomenon that import protection leads to export promotion. j’ In 
essence, it is easy to see that if firms are identical, economies of scale yield 
irreversible gains (as when learning occurs); and if one firm has access to two 
markets and the other has access to only one because its market is closed to imports 
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and the other’s is not, the firm in the protected market will gain a permanent 
advantage.s2 This may even be to social advantage (although this is not guar- 
anteed). 
The sudden popular awareness of this demonstration, s3 brought out from the 
closet by younger trade theorists and put into the political arena, s 4  has lent critical 
ideological support to the export lobbies seeking outward reach in foreign markets 
and to Congressmen who see in this a justification for aggressively ‘opening 
foreign markets’. 
The combination of export interests and ideology has been a heady brew, 
enough to provide the momentum for the ‘open foreign markets’ thrust in United 
States trade policy. But export interests have profited equally from the payments 
difficulties discussed earlier. Just as the belief that import restrictions will cure the 
trade deficit refuses to die, rising ever again like Jaws in James Bond movies, so 
does its flip side: that lowering foreign trade barriers will cure the trade deficit. 
Those who make policy in Congress are doomed to believe it; and those who seek 
to export willy-nilly have not hesitated to exploit it. 
Promoting the Lobbies: The growth of the export lobbies was encouraged by the 
Administration. Faced with the outbreak of import protectionism in the country 
and on Capitol Hill, the Administration back-tracked - with the Plaza Agreement 
- on its international macro-economic position of benign neglect. The induced, 
and inevitable, realignment of the dollar was the safety valve that had to be 
opened. 
Equally, the Administration saw in the nascent export lobbies the opportunity to 
provide a political offset to the (import) protectionist lobbies. By nurturing them, 
and expanding trade through measures aimed at ‘opening markets’, the Admin- 
istration would take the political momentum away from the protectionists who 
would ‘close markets’. 
In essence, the Administration did this in two ways, one consonant with the 
tradition of multilateralism, the other not quite so. The former was to push 
energetically for a new GATT round of multilateral trade negotiations where 
barriers to trade in old and new sectors (agriculture and services) of export interest 
to the United States would be brought down. These efforts culminated in the 
current Uruguay Round negotiations. The other course was to embrace region- 
alism in the shape of the free trade agreement with Canada, a dramatic and visible 
‘trade-expanding’ move and one which also, in its inclusion of agreements on 
services, was supposed to provide a spur to the Uruguay Round negotiations in the 
deliberations on trade in services. 
The preceding analysis focused on the many factors that have been driving the 
United States in the directions of unilateralism and regionalism even while it is an 
active participant in multilateral negotiations. The following analysis now offers 
an evaluation of these shifts, starting with unilateralism. 
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ARGUMENTS FOR UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS BY OTHERS 
Unilateralism relates to three different issues: (i) seeking unilateral trade 
concessions from others; (ii) refusing to submit oneself, as under the GATT, to the 
same dispute-settlement procedures in determining violations of one’s trade rights 
that one uses against others; and (iii) defining new ‘unfair trade’ practices, and 
hence new trading rights and disciplines, through unilateral specification and 
threatened punishment for non-compliance rather than by negotiated treaty. 
I shall have something to say (in the next section) about the use of threats by the 
United States, as embodied in the new 301 provisions, to establish new disciplines. 
Here, however, I address the pervasive view that America is entitled to something 
for nothing from others - especially from the Far East and Japan - by way of 
trade concessions. This view certainly lends the cutting edge to the forms of 
unilateralism distinguished above. 
Economists have generally believed that unilateral trade liberalization by 
oneself is good. There are, indeed, well-known theoretical exceptions that are 
explained in the classroom that can cause the relation between the reduction of 
trade barriers and the increase in welfare to be non-monotonic. But they are not of 
great policy consequence. 5 5  
The approach to trade liberalization, enshrined in the GATT, is to bargain 
concessions on trade. There is ‘first-difference’ reciprocity: the reductions of 
barriers are generally mutual and ‘balanced’. (Overall or full reciprocity - that is, 
balance of overall openness of one’s markets - is presumably taken care of 
through setting an appropriate ‘price’ to GATT membership.) Such reciprocity of 
trade concessions is often considered ‘mercantilist’; it suggests that trade libera- 
lization is a cost rather than a benefit. But it makes sense in two ways. (i) If I 
liberalize and get you also to liberalize reciprocally, I benefit twice: I reduce my 
own barriers while I also improve my trading gains through the reduction of your 
barriers. 5 6  (ii) There is also a ‘second-best’ argument when macro-economics 
does not work well. In this event, trade liberalization by oneself may lead to 
short-run adjustment costs, whereas simultaneous trade liberalization by others 
will reduce these costs. 5 7  
But the current approach of the United States to trade liberalization is altogether 
novel. It appears to demand that others (such as Japan) liberalize unilaterally (or 
else the crowbar will be used). How is this to be justified? As one reads the 
occasional justifications in different sources, a number of rationales can be 
discerned in an emotionally-charged debate. 
Balance-of-Payments Arguments: A couple of arguments related to the 
payments situation can be distinguished: 
(a) Japan has an enormous surplus in her trade balance and therefore she 
should liberalize her trade barriers faster than others. 
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(b) The United States has an enormous trade deficit and therefore it is 
appropriate to ask others, who do not have a similar affliction, to liberalize 
their trade unilaterally. 
These two arguments are related but still distinct. 5 8  The latter, however, serves as 
the stepping stone to the former, which is the main driving force behind the 
pressures directed at Japan. 
But this contention is not convincing because changes in trade barriers will not 
generally procure the sustained improvements in trade deficits which are desired 
unless a differential impact on the levels of savings and investment in the desired 
direction can be plausibly argued. In the absence of such impacts, the long-run 
effect of reduced foreign trade barriers will generally be to increase the trade-to- 
GNP ratio at which the United States deficit will persist. j9 
There is a further ‘systemic’ objection to the argument. Suppose one wants to 
argue that freer world trade is a desirable goal, that it is (in the short run) easier for 
countries enjoying a large and persistent surplus to reduce trade barriers and that, 
consequently, such countries ought to take unilateral actions to liberalize trade 
without matching, mutual and reciprocal liberalization by others. If that is the 
case, one ought to work in the GATT, and in the IMF, to introduce such rufes into 
the international institutions. Such rules could be built into revisions to the articles 
of the GATT that deal with balance-of-payments provisions (Article XI1 and 
Article XVIII). 6o But to use this notion selectively against Japan and other targeted 
countries, through the unilateral exercise of power and without the corresponding 
assumption of a similar obligation when one’s own deficit will turn into a surplus 
(as it surely will), is to sanction the view that it is fine for the big dog on the block 
to bark at - and also bite - the little dogs. The GATT properly assigns instead a 
symmetry of obligations and rights, establishing the rule of law rather than the law 
of the jungle. 
The ‘Japan-is-Cheating ’Argument: What of the argument that Japan is cheating 
on the trade obligations which she assumed through the reduction of her trade 
barriers in successive GATT rounds during the post-war period? The negotiated 
cuts in Japan’s trade barriers are not effective, it is said. Article XXIII, relating to 
impairment and nullification of obligations assumed by GATT members, is 
implicitly being invoked. 
Japan, on this basis, can be asked to liberalize unilaterally. The demand, 
however, is not really for unilateral trade concessions. It is really a matter of 
returning to the true status quo as defined by obligations assumed earlier as part of 
the negotiated, reciprocal exchange of trade concessions. 
The argument conjures up the image of the Japanese jackass refusing to move 
towards the carrot being offered. When you look behind him, you see the samurai 
holding him by the tail. One has to demonstrate, in short, that the effects of 
reduced trade barriers have been nullified and that this has been caused by 
governmental interventions aimed at securing such nullification. 
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The econometric studies directed at the problem of whether Japan imports ‘too 
little’, either in aggregate or in manufactures, were motivated by this problem. If 
Japan is as open as she seems, how come her imports are so low? In particular, if 
Japan is significantly off the regression line on import shares, making her an outlier 
(in econometric jargon), then we can deduce that she is an out-and-out liar (in 
fulfilling her trade obligations). There are serious problems with this case against 
Japan. 
1. As a recent paper by Koichi Hamada and T.N. Srinivasan argues, the 
econometric studies have been badly divided on the issue of Japan’s import 
performance, but those which are better crafted and grounded in econometrically 
appropriate methodology 61 do not support the view that it is unduly disappointing. 
2. But even had the econometrics gone the other way, the results would not 
reveal that the hand of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in 
Tokyo was responsible for those results or that the cause was instead a host of other 
factors, including buyer preferences and institutional features which are conven- 
tionally, and for good reasons, treated as part of a country’s ‘givens’ subject to 
which gains from trade are to be achieved in open markets. 
The ‘Japan-is-Different ’ Argument: In fact, it is interesting that Japan-bashing 
has now shifted increasingly away from the notion of the (malign) efficacy of the 
Japanese Government’s invisible hand as the culprit and towards, instead, the 
inefficacy of Adam Smith’s invisible hand as the source of trouble! Let me explain. 
Economists take one’s tastes as one’s own affair. Given your tastes and mine, 
each sovereign in this regard, we can still engage in profitable, voluntary 
exchange. Economists do not argue, quite properly, that you must change your 
tastes to suit my convenience.62 That is the stuff of coercion and the politics of 
power. But that is precisely what some seem to want of Japan. They want her 
consumers and producers to change their tastes. 
A recent Newsweek story typically reflected these sentiments when it reported 
on Japanese consumers. 6 3  
‘[Japanese] consumers [do not1 seem about to shed their bias against 
foreign goods. At one of INBIX’s NIC stores recently, a 50-year-old 
salaryman looked at a CD player made in South Korea. The price was less 
than half of what he would pay anywhere else in Tokyo. He shrugged, then put 
it back. “No,” he said. “I’m afraid it might break.”’ 
The Newsweek reporters could have produced a more effective splash in the United 
States by repeating the story (no doubt apocryphal and born of the tensions 
produced by what is perceived as unfair Japan-bashing) where a Tokyo housewife 
walks into a Ginza store looking for a camera. Shown high-quality cameras, she 
asks: ‘Don’t you have something cheaper?’ The answer: ‘No. But just walk down 
the block. At the corner you will find a shop selling shoddy American stuff.’ 
But not all tastes, for or against imported goods, are ‘irrational’. They can be 
grounded in reality more than is conceded by those who point accusing fingers. I 
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recall writing nearly three decades ago from New Delhi to Harry Johnson on 
Indian stationery, complaining like V.S.  Naipaul about the ‘craze for foreign’. He 
came back with what could have a lesson for the American-Japan debate: ‘If the 
quality of the paper you have written on is any indication, the craze seems quite 
sensible to me. ’ 
The question of buyer preferences among Japanese firms for one another’s 
goods is an even more explosive issue. It has received support recently from 
Mordechai Kreinin’s study, reported in The World Economy, of 62 subsidiaries in 
Australia of Japanese, European and American companies examining the com- 
parative way they procure equipment from sources outside Australia. 64  
The issue is not whether such preferences exist. The issue is why. A large part 
of the buyer preference in Japanese businesses must relate to the value attached to 
customer relationships. That is an idea which is not merely sociological but is now 
incorporated as a possibly rational form of profit-maximizing behaviour in the 
modern theory of industrial organization. Even casual empiricism, based on one’s 
exposure to American firms and products, whether autos or suits, shows that the 
philosophy underlying the American approach to consumers is caveat emptor, 
buyer beware. Dissatisfied or duped consumers must take recourse to litigation, 
aided by the largest legal establishment in the world; they are also supposed to vote 
with their feet where repeat-buying is involved. 
The Japanese way is different. Their legal establishment is also correspondingly 
of a piece, small and lean, not large and mean. Consumer loyalty follows. It then 
becomes hard for American-style competitors to lure customers away by simply 
offering discounts that carry no assurance of follow-through and commitment to 
consumer satisfaction. Large enough discounts could overcome this problem. 
Everything has its price. But complaints of collusive Japanese preference for their 
own fill the air when discounts that are within reason but below those necessary 
lead to failure to find Japanese customers. It is not surprising that American firms 
that have made the necessary effort to adapt to Japanese ways have done well and 
are not among the vociferous complainants against ‘autarkic’ Japanese corporate 
buying preferences. 
The buying preferences of Japanese consumers and firms are not grounds for 
demanding unilateral trade concessions from Japan. The appropriate attitude to the 
question of different Japanese preferences was conveyed by Paul Samuelson, who 
tells of encountering a charming old lady at a public lecture in Boston on trade 
policy. She went up to the Nobel Prize economist and said: ‘Professor Samuelson, 
I would like to help by buying American, but the Japanese goods are so much 
better. Am I wrong in buying them instead?’ Professor Samuelson answered, 
‘Madam, you should buy what you like. Leave it to us economists and the 
Congress to take care of the balance of payments.’ 
In any event, buying preferences are not areas which can be significantly 
influenced by policy. Yasuhiro Nakasone’s appeals to the Japanese, when he was 
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their Prime Minister, to ‘buy American’ are likely to have been as ineffective as, if 
more ludicrous than, those addressed by Americans to other Americans. Deterrent 
penalties and taxes by the government on those firms who do not buy American, or 
subsidies to those who do, are certainly policy instruments that could be deployed. 
But it is doubtful whether these can be seriously contemplated by a democratic 
government such as the Japanese any more than the United States Congress could 
enact a corresponding set of tax policies to penalize the consumption of American 
goods or subsidize the purchase of foreign ones. 6 5  
What, then, about the question of access to these buyers, no matter what their 
preferences? The retail distribution system in Japan, with its 1.6 million mon-and- 
pop-style stores dotting the country and protected against large stores (recently by 
the passage in the Diet of the Large-scale Retail Store Law), militates against the 
distribution of foreign goods. 6 6  
This question is tricky. It needs careful handling at the level of general 
principles rather than immediate expediency. In particular, we need to ask here 
(and, indeed, similarly for other institutional issues) the following questions: 
(a) Are these institutions designed to discriminate in favour of domestic 
goods and against foreign rivals? 
(b) If their unintended fall-out is to affect trade directly, can we think of 
‘next-best’ ways in which such effects can be minimized. 
(c) In seeking such relief, can we think not just of others accommodating to 
our needs but of establishing general disciplines, and neutral procedures to 
settle disputes relating thereto, to which we subject ourselves as much as we 
seek to subject others? 
In the case of the Japanese distribution system, the answer to question ‘a’ is 
surely, ‘No’. The answer to question ‘b’ is that it does inhibit, although it does not 
prevent, access for firms that prefer marketing products through large outlets, but 
that these firms could adapt their sales techniques with possibilities such as 
mail-order selling, which has begun and offers a possible way out. As for question 
‘c’, if national distribution systems are to be considered legitimate grounds for 
foreign scrutiny, the United States should propose procedures under which it 
becomes possible for other trading countries generally to challenge its own 
distributive institutions and methods as well. 67 An advantage of such general 
procedures, applying symmetrically, is that it would slow down the one-way 
demands for others to ‘reform’ which are otherwise readily generated by lobbies 
in the United States. The argument by the Administration that one’s excesses can 
come home to roost has traditionally helped to contain such excesses. There is no 
reason to expect that it would fail to do so in this area. 
It is necessary to observe that the path down which the United States is currently 
going in its negotiations with Japan under the rubric of the Structural Impediments 
Initiative, where matters such as Japan’s retail distribution system and even her 
‘high’ savings rate are being discussed as obstacles to trade, is the path of folly. 
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This is so not merely because it proceeds on a one-on-one basis without the benefit 
of general procedures uniformly applying to all. It is also because, once one starts 
bringing into the trade arena issues such as rates of savings, one is essentially 
arguing that everything affects trade, that policy (or absence thereof) on virtually 
everything will affect trade and, accordingly, every policy can be put on the line in 
discussing what is ‘fair trade’ and a prerequisite for legitimate free trade. 
Thus if Bangladesh currently has a comparative advantage in textiles, due to 
lower wages, we no longer need to worry about being scolded as protectionists 
when we reject imports of Bangladeshi textiles as unfair trade caused by her 
‘pauper labour’. After all, the low Bangladeshi wages are a result of inadequate 
population-control policies and, too, of inefficient economic policies that inhibit 
investment and growth and thus a rise in real wages. Or, if the United States 
continues to produce textiles which rely heavily on immigrant labour, often 
illegal, this is unfair trade because American immigration policy encourages this 
outcome and, therefore, a demand for changes in immigration policy needs to be 
made against the United States simply to ensure a level playing field. 
In going down this unwise trade route, the American makers of trade policy 
have put the world trading system at great risk. If everything becomes a question of 
fair trade, the only outcome will be to remove altogether the possibility of ever 
agreeing to a rule-based trading system. ‘Managed trade’ would then be the 
outcome, with bureaucrats allocating trade according to what domestic lobbying 
pressures and foreign political muscle dictate. 
Unfortunately, this danger is not seen by many in the United States who, in the 
current psychology attending the ‘diminished giant’ syndrome, fail to look at the 
long-run and systemic implications of what they propose as short-term policy 
options for the United States. 
The Divergence between Ex Ante and Ex Post Outcomes: Yet another reason for 
making demands for unilateral trade concessions by others can be detected. It is 
based on the notions of Japan’s anti-foreign-goods biases, ‘natural’ and institu- 
tional, but uses them in an altogether different way. 
The argument is that when Japan’s cuts in trade barriers were accepted during 
earlier GATT rounds as ‘equivalent’, ‘matching’ or ‘balanced’ relative to Ameri- 
can cuts, the negotiators for the United States over-estimated the extent to which 
Japanese imports would rise - given Japan’s buying preferences and institutions. 
But, as we now know, these forces are of such importance that what Japan gave 
was far below what America gave. The ex post realities show that the trade in 
concessions was unbalanced, thus giving the United States the moral, perhaps 
even the legal, right to ‘reopen the issue’ and ask for unilateral concessions from 
Japan. 
This notion that ‘first-difference’ reciprocity be negotiated (inevitably) on ex 
ante perceptions of mutual advantages while it can be renegotiated on the basis of 
expost outcomes is certainly present in some of the sentiments for unilateralism in 
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American demands for others to move towards new trade concessions without 
reciprocal concessions by the United States. Edmund Dell, Secretary of State for 
Trade in the British Government in 1976-78, writes cogently on the subject: 
‘There has been a feeling in the United States that in many cases, whatever 
the intention or skill of American negotiators, reciprocity has not been 
achieved. Some of its trading partners have been found to have had the better 
of the bargain. This is particularly seen to be the case in the trade relations of 
the United States with Japan. . . Robert Dole, now majority leader in the 
United States Senate, [has argued1 that “reciprocity should be assessed not 
by what agreements promise but by actual results - by changes in the 
balance of trade and investment between ourselves and our major economic 
partners”. There is pressure, therefore, to the effect that the United States 
should withdraw something of what it has conceded - especially, although 
not entirely, in its relations with Japan.’68 
More importantly, the qentiment and the pressure translate into unilateral 
demands for unmatched concessions by Japan, in particular. But there are several 
things to be said about this sentiment. 
1. In terms of GATT law, is the ‘reopening’ of negotiated concessions in this 
fashion permissible? Article XXIII relates to impairment and nullification of 
negotiated GATT agreements. Whether this would extend to alleged ex post 
outcomes that depart from expected outcomes is highly dubious. There certainly 
do not seem to be any precedents in dispute settlements under Article XXIII that 
would provide ammunition to the General Counsel to the United States Trade 
Representative, should the latter take up the matter for an authoritative ruling on 
the subject. 
2. The reopening of contractual commitments is generally considered destruc- 
tive of orderly trade and intercourse, with exceptions permitted only when the 
contract was signed under duress or when the doctrine of ‘intervening impossi- 
bility’ can be invoked - both exemptions usually requiring a heavy burden of 
proof by those who seek relief. If the United States were to argue for nullification 
of its trade obligations towards Japan, it seems improbable that it could win, with 
legitimacy, on either of the two grounds mentioned. 
3. Moreover, just imagine what would happen to the trading system if ex post 
outcomes, themselves reflecting a host of factors which cannot possibly be 
isolated and quantified persuasively, were to be used to renege on trade concess- 
ions or to demand more from others after deals had been struck at trade 
negotiations. 
The ‘Imbalance-from-Shift-in-Comparative-Advantage’ Argument: A different 
argument for unilateral liberalization because of ex post realities diverging from 
ex ante expectations can be traced to the feeling that shifts in comparative 
advantage have created an imbalance of mutual advantages from earlier trade 
concessions. 
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American policy makers, persuaded by lobbies and by independent evidence, 
feel that American comparative advantage has shifted in favour of agriculture and 
services. These are the sectors that are subjected to high trade barriers and to the 
failure of GATT  discipline^.^^ In consequence, the same structure of trade 
barriers produces now, in the American view, a lower average barrier in the 
markets of the United States for others than for the United States in the markets of 
others. 
Therefore, although the initial reductions of barriers were balanced, they 
cannot be regarded as such anymore. The United States is accordingly justified in 
asking for changes in trade barriers in these sectors simply to restore the balance of 
negotiated advantages. While, of course, the United States is willing to have 
mutual reductions in trade barriers in these new sectors, the fact that they are of 
principal export benefit to itself means that they amount to an unbalanced trade 
concession going its way. 
The ‘Coming-ofAge ’Argument: An argument which applies not to Japan but to 
other countries of the Far East (and potentially to other newly industrializing 
countries which are successful exporters) is that they have had a free lunch so far, 
having been afforded special-and-differential treatment in GATT negotiations, 
thanks to which they could use tariffs and other trade barriers but profited from the 
general reductions in the trade barriers of developed countries in the post-war 
period because of unconditional MFN treatment. In terms of ‘ first-difference’ 
reciprocity, these countries secured unbalanced trade concessions in their favour, 
making overall access to their markets significantly less than their access to the 
markets of the developed countries. For those countries, such as South Korea and 
Taiwan, which have come of age in terms of both exports and per capita incomes, 
this ‘affirmative action’ is no longer justified. They must now assume their full 
obligations as GATT members, as the developed countries do. This means that 
they must unilaterally lower trade barriers or, what is the same thing, provide 
greater concessions in future negotiations than they get. 
Within the logic of reciprocity, the argument is well taken. Special-and- 
differential treatment for the developing countries was never granted by other 
GATT members as a permanent ‘benefit’, simply because the GATT is premised 
on the assumption of symmetric rights and obligations and on ‘first-difference’ 
reciprocity as a method of negotiation to reduce barriers and, for that reason, any 
exemption from the symmetric obligations has to be legitimated. For developing 
countries, this legitimacy was provided by infant-industry and balance-of- 
payments arguments (as reflected in Article XVIII). But the developmental status 
of some developing countries has changed; and the theoretical support for 
exempting any of them from the obligations of open market access on grounds 
such as balance-of-payments difficulties has also waned. ’O On both grounds, the 
‘coming-of-age’ argument for seeking unilateral concessions from South Korea 
and Taiwan has acquired cogency. 
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The ‘I-am-More-Open-Than-Thou ’ Argument: Finally, there is in many 
quarters the firm belief that the United States is more open than other countries, 
not just the developing ones. This also helps to fuel demands for unilateral trade 
concessions by others, especially when combined with another belief that immedi- 
ately after World War I1 and in the 1950s and 60s the United States was altruistic in 
trade policy, but, in its age of relative decline, must now rejoin the human race and 
‘look after its own interests’. 
But evidence on the trade barriers of the United States, particularly after the 
proliferation of high-track as well as low-track protection in the 1980s, certainly 
does not provide support for the view that it is now significantly more open than 
other developed countries. 7 ’  
This is hard to believe because the United States, formed by immigration, is far 
more ‘open’ in its cultural attitudes and willingness to experiment with foreign 
ideas, foreign influences and foreign goods than most other countries, most of all 
Japan. But culture does not necessarily translate into corresponding trade policy. 
The latter reflects equally the play of politics and economic forces. There is in 
consequence nothing inconsistent, although much that is incongruous, about a 
culturally-open society having access to its markets as restricted by trade policy as 
a country (such as Japan) which is more inward looking in its citizens’ attitudes. 
Again, the culturalists find it difficult to believe that protectionism can coexist 
with a deficit in the balance of trade. Thus James Fallows has recently written: 
‘Japanese and Korean politicians now complain about American “protec- 
tionism”, but how protectionist can a country with a $10 billion monthly trade 
deficit really be?’72 Mr Fallows, whose initial wisdom on America’s ‘Japan 
fixation’ has unfortunately yielded to exaggerated pessimism and folly in later 
writings, is remiss here. Any given degree of protectionism is generally compa- 
tible with any level of trade surplus or deficit. 
Perhaps the only countervailing argument in support of the presumption that the 
United States is more open is that it is most open in regard to receiving foreign 
investment and that this can give foreign suppliers in some cases more effective 
access to the American market. 7 3  This asymmetry certainly applies to Japan and is 
an argument for pressing Japan for greater mutuality of openness in the matter of 
foreign investment. 
As for the view that the United States acted altruistically - that is, as a 
unilateral free trader of sorts - during the post-war period, this too can be 
exaggerated. It is useful to remember that, unlike Britain through most of the 
nineteenth century, the United States has never been a unilateral free trader, 
generally insisting on reciprocity in trade concessions - as signified by the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and later by the contractarian concep- 
tion of the GATT. Do not forget either that the first agricultural waiver from 
GATT discipline was secured by the United States in 1955, effectively leading to 
the chaotic situation in agriculture today. The United States was also among the 
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earliest countries to start restricting textile imports, initiating the descent down the 
road to the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA) that restricts and regulates exports of 
textiles and clothing from developing to developed countries. 
These matters need a reminder, not to deny the justly celebrated leadership of 
the United States (as distinct from altruism) in the conduct of trade policy and in 
promoting the concerted reduction of tariff barriers through successive GATT 
rounds, but simply to prevent exaggerated notions of past altruism leading to 
current policies of system-destroying selfishness. 
It is perhaps worth remarking that the theme of America’s greater openness can 
be used selectively and has not deterred similar pressures being exercised against 
countries for trade concessions even when they are unambiguously more open than 
the United States. While America’s greater openness vis-h-vis Japan is open to 
doubt, Hong Kong’s greater openness vis-hi-vis America is not. In fact, Hong 
Kong, aside from nineteenth-century Britain, is a textbook example of (substan- 
tially) free trade. Yet the high-handzdness of the United States in dealing with its 
legal services industry was a matter of public dispute in early 1989 as the legal 
profession of Hong Kong was threatened by punitive tariff retaliation for the 
colony unless it opened up Hong Kong to American lawyers.74 In short, the 
assumed greater openness of the United States has served as a way of demanding 
unilateral trade concessions from others, used where it can be made without 
obvious implausibility and discarded when it plays the wrong way. 
THE CROWBAR: SECTION 301 AND SUPER 301 
These arguments for unilateral trade concessions by others, many of them not 
compelling on detailed scrutiny, but all of political potency, together with the 
growth of interests that were sketched earlier, made it inevitable that the trade 
policy of the United States would move in the direction of Section 301 and Super 
301 with the Trade Act of 1988. Such one-way demands cannot be satisfied with 
the conventional techniques and within the framework of the GATT. In the GATT 
framework, trade concessions can be found only by offering one’s own. By 
contrast, unilateral concessions must be extracted, not by gentle negotiations but 
by threat. 
Moreover, export interests are evidently at a disadvantage in the GATT 
framework where trade concessions by others are available on a non-discrimina- 
tory basis to all GATT members and hence give one no privileged access in the 
new markets, whereas trade concessions can be captured to one’s preferential 
advantage through ‘voluntary import expansions’ (VIES) and trade diversions 
towards themselves when the concessions are obtained instead in a one-on-one 
bilateral framework. 7 5  Section 301, originally enacted in 1974, but suitably 
endowed with sharper claws in the 1988 Act, is a policy instrument that can serve 
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these ends, amounting therefore to what can be fairly described as ‘export 
protectionism’. 76 
But there are two other, partly inter-related, factors that must also be cited as 
having led to the rise of Section 301 to its prominent role in policy-making. 
First, the panic identified earlier over the trade deficit and over possible 
de-industrialization certainly produced a sense of crisis which created, in turn, 
the sense that urgent action was needed to prevent America’s continuing ruin- 
ation. Even if the many arguments for extracting something for nothing in trade 
had not been seen to be legitimate, the impatience for quick results on the trade 
front would have imperilled the commitment to multilateralism under the GATT. 
Given the United States’ indisputable (even if diminished) strength and new 
willingness to wield a crowbar and thus use its muscle, it could certainly go 
fasrer, even in getting others to make balanced and mutual (rather than unilateral) 
concessions in matters that it considered essential to its trade interests, if it used 
one-on-one techniques. In place of the GATT, sometimes (naively) denounced as 
the General Agreement to Talk and Talk, the Section-301 procedures could 
guarantee the quicker attention and response that was considered urgently 
necessary. 
Second, there was also the more benign view that one-on-one techniques were 
complementary to, rather than substitutes for, GATT-centred multilateralism. 
They would, by ruffling feathers and demonstrating American resolve, bring 
other countries to the bargaining table at the GATT on agricultural trade and on the 
‘new issues’ of trade in services, trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) and 
trade aspects of the protection of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) ” when 
others had been dragging their feet. 
For both these arguments the underlying common denominator is the sense of 
urgency and consequent impatience. But the payments deficit driving the im- 
patience has little demonstrated relationship to results on trade policy. It is a non 
sequitur to translate urgency on the trade deficit into urgency on getting results in 
the conduct of trade policy. 
Nor can it be seriously maintained that the type of unilateralism characterized 
by Section 301 was necessary to get the Uruguay Round negotiations going. 
Admittedly, the European Community’s refusal to support the launch of multi- 
lateral trade negotiations, as desired by the United States, at the special GATT 
ministerial meeting of November 1982 was a major blow to American efforts to 
get new disciplines negotiated multilaterally. But three factors, other than the new 
Super-301 provisions (enacted less than two years afrer the Uruguay Round 
negotiations were launched), were responsible for the Community turning around: 
(a) There was a growing realization by the Community, not present in 
1982, that on the new issues of trade in services, TRIMs and TRIPs its 
member countries would benefit as well as the United States, so that they also 
had much to gain from a new GATT round. 
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(b) The free trade proposal with Canada suggested that the United States 
would embrace regionalism more extensively as a substitute for GATT-wide 
multilateralism, extending this approach also to the new issues, if the other 
trading countries did not agree to a new GATT round. 
(c) And the mood in the United States Congress, as often before earlier 
GATT rounds, was protectionist and ugly enough to make it seem necessary 
for other countries to begin multilateral trade negotiations to help the United 
States Administration resist protectionist pressures. 7 8  
There is very little to suggest that Section 301 was necessary or was instrumental 
in any way in getting the Uruguay Round negotiations launched. 
Unfortunately the Section-301 instrument has many difficulties inherent in it 
and corresponding possibilities of damage to the world trading system. Some 
difficulties are bad enough. Others are serious. 
When the United States confronts the strong, such as the European Com- 
munity, with Section-301 actions, it is likely to provoke strongly spirited reac- 
tions - as in fact happened with the Section-301 action which led to the dispute 
over trade in hormone-fed beef. While such disputes will settle, with cataclysms 
such as generalized ‘trade wars’ highly improbable, the battle still leaves scars. 
The ethos spreads that the trading system is unfair. Xenophobia can strengthen. 
Protectionists can only find this to their advantage as they continually seek to 
manoeuvre the legislative and administrative processes to obtain protection. 
When the United States confronts the weak, the latter are likely to buckle 
under, as South Korea did on insurance earlier and on the Super-301 threats she 
escaped on 25 May 1989. But the danger now is that the smaller countries which 
the United States confronts in trade will view the Super-301 actions as the way of 
the bully, reviving the image of the ‘ugly American’, leading gratuitously to 
anti-Americanism. 
But, even if American policy makers were unmindful of these consequences, 
there is a strong likelihood that the targets of their Section-301 actions will satisfy 
American demands by diverting trade from other countries (with smaller political 
clout) to the United States, satisfying the strong at the expense of the weak.79 
America does not open markets efficiently this way. She diverts trade. While this 
serves the interests of the United States and its exporters, it replaces economic 
efficiency with political clout as the determinant of trade. 
This danger has been recognized by the United States Trade Representative. 
Ambassador Hills now repeatedly stresses how she will ensure that markets are 
opened under Super 301 in a non-discriminatory fashion. But ex ante intentions 
can diverge from ex post outcomes. The lobbies in the United States that 
influence the USTR do not really care whether markets open generally; their 
objective is to secure market access for themselves and their general thrust is to 
judge openness in terms of their own success. Equally the countries targeted for 
action know that the American pressures are therefore more likely to ease if the 
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United States gets a good share than if it does not. The game is set up in terms of 
implicit pro-trade-diversion-bias rules that all parties recognize as political 
realities. 
Then again there is the problem with the actual use of the crowbar. It is not 
merely unwise. It has also been occasionally GATT illegal. 
The GATT has the legal force of a treaty in the United States. ’” GATT illegality 
therefore violates a treaty commitment. The feeling that the GATT can be 
disregarded (‘Who cares about the GATT?’) because ‘we never ratified it’ is 
widespread but unjustified. Consequently the United States is not free to retaliate 
at will by raising tariffs on goods. It has nonetheless done so in the cases of 
Brazilian informatics, beef from the European Community and arguably Japanese 
semi-conductors. In this regard, it was not surprising that at the GATT Council 
meeting in January 1989,5 1 member countries joined in invoking Article XXIII in 
protest against the American violation of GATT obligations; and the Super-301 
actions of 25 May 1989 (which offer the prospect of ultimate GATT-illegal 
retaliation if they are to be effective) have drawn virtually unanimous condem- 
nation from other trading countries. 
The United States therefore stands in the dock accused of violating (or threaten- 
ing to violate) GATT rules. This brings into disrepute the Administration’s efforts 
in the Uruguay Round negotiations to strengthen the GATT trading system by 
putting the United States in what foreign countries see as an inconsistent position 
via-u-vis the GATT. 
Even if one were to disregard GATT illegality, on the (not persuasive) ground 
that some ‘creative illegality’ was necessary to get GATT member countries to 
agree to a new GATT round, the essential drawback to Super 301, as currently 
designed, is that it does not impose on the United States the same disciplines, and 
the same procedures to establish them and settle disputes under them, as it imposes 
by threat on others. It is thus built on the asymmetry of power which serves the 
United States interests because it is the more powerful vis-u-vis most targets. But 
this is not the way of a properly functioning international trade order in which 
rights and obligations are symmetrical. The GATT was correctly built on the 
conception of the rule of law where obligations apply reasonably uniformly to 
all. *‘ 
In view of the serious drawbacks of the Super-301 instrument, how does one 
cope with it? The Super-301 actions on 25 May 1989 suggest that, given the 
strength of Congressional sentiments, the Bush Administration is unwilling to 
expend political goodwill to stop the folly of its use when ‘push comes to shove’. 82 
It cannot be eliminated by new legislation: the United States Congress is the 
problem, not the solution. The only way out is to defang the monster. Bearing in 
mind that Super 301 cannot work unless the threat of retaliation is credible, and 
that such retaliation would be almost certainly GATT illegal, the targeted coun- 
tries should raise the matter formally in the GATT (whenever retaliation is 
UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY 467 
undertaken). 83  A finding that Super-301 retaliatory actions would be GATT 
illegal would then put the matter squarely into President Bush’s lap. He must either 
violate the treaty obligations of the GATT or exercise the discretion built into the 
1988 Act and say ‘No’ to the protagonists of Super-301 actions. I imagine he 
would choose the latter option. 84  
FIX-QUANTITY TRADING REGIMES OR MANAGED TRADE 
While the analysis of the demerits of the Super-301 approach to prying open 
foreign markets, and of its intimate relationship with export interests and the ethos 
legitimizing the seeking of unilateral trade concessions by others, requires sophis- 
ticated reasoning, the demerits of managed trade are more egregious and obvious 
to economists. 
The proponents of managed trade seek to define targets of ‘appropriate’ exports 
in specific industries to foreign countries with comniitments by those countries to 
fulfil the targets.” While these targets can relate to total imports, or to total 
imports from the United States, they are typically more narrowly defined as 
specific quantitative targets for specific imports from the United States. An 
example is the American pact with Japan on trade in semi-conductors, recording 
the demand for a 20 per cent American share in the Japanese market. 
The 1980s have seen a proliferation of such ‘fix-quantity’ trade arrangements in 
regard to one’s imports: ‘voluntary’ export restraints (VERs) on autos and steel 
are a typical example. If the managed-trade proponents had their way, there would 
be ‘voluntary import expansions’ for one’s exports to match these VERs for one’s 
imports. 
These demands derive from some of the same conceptions about Japan that 
drive the demands for unilateral trade concessions by her: in particular, that her 
policies, preferences and institutions make Japan hard to penetrate. Therefore, 
quantitative commitments by Japan to import specific quantities of particular 
goods from the United States, in whatever way the Japanese do so, are deemed 
necessary. 
This would mean the replacement of the fix-rule approach to trade, as built into 
the GATT, by a fix-quantity trade regime. We would be replacing the rule of law 
that the GATT embodies, where trading countries compete subject to common 
rules, by a system where politics and bureaucrats would essentially determine 
trade quantities. Before this retrograde step is taken, the case for it must be 
examined, for it is exceptionally flawed. 
For one thing, the notion that Japan’s policies, preferences and institutions 
make it hard, even impossible, to sell to her people is unsupported by the facts. 
Not merely is it impossible to support econometrically, with any confidence, the 
contention that Japan imports too little. But, at the margin as well, there is enough 
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evidence to show that Japan’s imports respond to price changes, such as the rise of 
the yen and the fall of the dollar, much the way other countries’ imports do.86 
Despite their many cultural differences, known to anyone who has read the great 
novelist Junichiro Tanizaki’s beautiful essay In Praise of Shadows, the Japanese 
belong to the same human race that Adam Smith wrote about. 
It is not meaningful to ask countries to ensure target quantities of specific 
imports. They can restrain exports by enforcement. But how are they to ensure 
imports by their consumers unless the state is the buyer? Subsidies by the United 
States could be an instrument to encourage more purchases; but how would the 
United States reconcile this with its general position in the GATT and in national 
practice against subsidization? Indeed, the United States imposes countervailing 
duties against subsidies by foreign rivals. 
There is also the oft-repeated claim that the targets to be set and enforced for 
imports of specific items from the United States by Japan will reflect the ‘fair’ and 
‘appropriate’ share of the Americans in the Japanese market. But this is not sensible. 
There is no sufficiently unambiguous and plausible way in which such fair shares 
can be estimated in general. Third-market shares of the United States and Japan are 
often cited by some to argue that Americans ought to enjoy similar shares in Japan 
herself. These third-market shares, however, will reflect relative expenditures by 
Americans and Japanese in cultivating these markets, the differential incidence of 
protection against Japanese exports in third markets (for example, the European 
Community has conducted a ‘Fortress Europe’ policy against Japan throughout the 
1980s), the value attached by these markets to different product characteristics and a 
host of other factors that do not carry over mechanically into the Japanese market. ’’ 
Besides, if Americans were to apply this approach to estimating how much they 
deny a fair share of their market for each traded product to other trading countries, 
they would be unpleasantly surprised, I am sure, at the ‘findings’ of their own 
hidden barriers against imports of specific items from specific countries. 
These objections apply also to the less restrictive versions of managed trade. 
The demand that Japan import specific quantities without specifying sources is 
better. But it is no more feasible and desirable than the demand for source-specific 
increases in imports by Japan. Nor is the version that Japan increase her total 
imports, or total imports of manufactures, by a target figure or be penalized. 
To proceed down the road to managed trade, despite its popularity with the 
export lobbies, its appeal on Capitol Hill and its advocacy by some, would just be 
another act of folly. 89 
REGIONALISM 
While, then, the turn to unilateralism and the pressures to embrace managed 
trade are matters which economists can reasonably agree to consider detrimental, 
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and even perilous, to the world trading system, the issue of regionalism is a matter 
where they can reasonably disagree. 
In theory, economists have long known that preferential trading arrangements 
can always be devised between any group of countries so that they are welfare- 
improving for those who undertake them and do not harm those who are outside. 9” 
By the conventional criteria for evaluating policies, such preferential arrange- 
ments would be considered desirable. 
The relevant question is whether the specific arrangements, such as the 
European Community or the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, meet 
these conditions. This question was seriously discussed in the 1960s when the 
Community was formed and when all kinds of regional arrangements such as 
EFTA, LAFTA, PAFTA and NAFTA9’ were being pursued or contemplated in 
different regions around the world in an early ‘play’ of what many think 
ahistorically is a novel trend today, two decades later (after the first trend died 
despite a similar show of apparent strength). 
Interestingly, this kind of question has hardly been posed in recent discussions 
of the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement and the United States-Canada 
one, at least at the time of the intense political debate that surrounded the latter. In 
short, one cannot find any parallel degree of scepticism and interest in the United 
States Congress or in academic analyses concerning the question whether the 
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement would lead to trade diversion and, if 
so, sufficiently to reduce rather than increase welfare for the United States, its 
partners and the world. 92 
The reason lies, it seems, in the virtue seen in the mere fact that the Canadian- 
American agreement represented, to the public eye, a dramatic pro-trade measure 
that would take the political momentum away from the protectionists. Trade 
diversion was no more a worry for policy makers here than it would be for those 
who ignored the likelihood of producing VIES rather than multilaterally open 
foreign markets when undertaking Super-301 actions. 
Virtue was also found in the fact that, as part of the Canadian-American 
agreement, progress was made in negotiating trade in services. This, too, was seen 
as imparting momentum, not merely by example but also by implied threat (that 
the United States, if necessary, would move ahead with ‘like-minded’ countries on 
services if the GATT talks failed), to the progress of the talks on trade in services 
in the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
An undisputed merit of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement has 
again been the inclusion, on Canadian initiative and insistence, of a bi-national 
procedure for reviewing national ‘unfair trade’ adjudications. In a world where 
countries increasingly make charges of unfair trade at one another, the old- 
fashioned ways of doing business in these matters are getting rapidly obsolete. The 
traditional way, where (say) Americans complain, and American institutions 
judge, much like Judge Dee of medieval China who acted as the prosecutor and the 
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judge, makes little sense in today’s world. Increasingly, we need to settle such 
complaints by neutral, impartial procedures, like those of the GATT. The 
Canadian-American agreement made a real contribution in that direction, paving 
the way for future models of institutional change designed to handle better and 
contain the damage from the increased obsessions with unfair trade. 
The problem, however, is that these benefits must be balanced against the costs. 
The major cost comes from an unanticipated fall-out of the United States-Canada 
Free Trade Agreement. The coincidence of the Canadian- American agreement 
and ‘Europe 1992’ was fortuitous. Europe 1992 was prompted by the wholly 
different goal of making the common market commoner, taking the last, difficult, 
almost insuperable, steps towards the political and economic unification that the 
Treaty of Rome had adopted as its objective. But the coincidence of these two 
dramatic events, plus the jaundiced view of the GATT on Capitol Hill and the 
indifference to the GATT illegality of the actions contemplated under the 
Super-301 provisions of the Trade Act of 1988, suggested to many abroad that, 
despite professions to the contrary from the Administration and its efforts at the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, the American commitment to multilateralism had 
ended. Regionalism had arrived. The world was fragmenting into trading blocs. 
Unfortunately, this inference of a trend from two observations can be self- 
fulfilling. It has tended to produce a sense in the Far East, for instance, that a 
Japan-centred regional bloc in the Asian-Pacific region may be necessary in a 
bloc-infested world. The effect would surely be to undermine the energies spent on 
making the Uruguay Round negotiations successful, with its vast and difficult 
agenda of remaking the GATT to suit the needs of the modern world. 
In my view, it is absolutely imperative for the United States to reject the 
temptation therefore to move towards further such regional arrangements, 
eschewing the suggestions to strike special deals with Mexico and others, so as to 
convey a clear message that the Canadian-American free trade area was a special 
event, much like European unification, with Europe 1992 as its culmination. 93 
Here lies the greater wisdom, if less immediate profit. 94 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
United States trade policy presents a confusing picture today, even a disturbing 
one. It is conceivable that the trends towards unilateralism and regionalism will 
fade away. Nothing in economics is predictable with certainty. But if the analysis 
presented here is accurate, many of the underlying causes of these trends are 
fundamental and, therefore, they are unlikely to vanish in the immediate future. 
The pessimistic scenario is that the United States will find itself unable to play 
the role of an energetic supporter of GATT-based multilateralism, being con- 
strained by the powerful forces working through the Congress. One may fear 
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equally that, unless the Administration manages to persuade the Congress that the 
extension of multilateral disciplines to complex new areas such as trade in services 
has necessarily to be a continuous and slow process, not to be judged in terms of 
immediate quick-fixes and ‘results’, the Congressional embrace of unilateralism 
and regionalism will intensify after the Uruguay Round negotiations are concluded 
at the end of 1990 and weaken further the capacity of the Administration to 
strengthen and revitalize a GATT-focused multilateral trading regime. 
At the same time, the newly emerging power, Japan, will not be able to play a 
major role either in that direction, much as it is also in her own interest, simply 
because she has never played the role before, having only recently acquired her 
economic sinews. There may then be a leadership vacuum, with the GATT and 
multilateralism falling through the cracks during this transition. 
The optimistic scenario, on the other hand, is that a clear delineation of these 
dangers, sharply sketched, will alert the United States Administration to the 
impending dangers and spur it into making the effort, both in Washington and in 
Geneva, to save the multilateral trading system which has served the United States 
and the world economy so well in the post-World War I1 period. 
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head Effect’, American EconumicReview. No. 4, 1988, pp. 773-85; and Richard Baldwin and Paul 
Krugman, Persistent Trade Effecrs of Large Exchange Rare Shocks, NBER Working Paper No. 20 I7 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research. 1986). 
13. This is evident from a report by Robert Kuttner (of a conference of the leading figures in 
international macro-economics in late 1987), ‘The Theory Gap on the Trade Gap’, New York Times, 
17 January 1988, Section 3 ,  p. 1, where the presence of trade barriers as an explanation of the failure 
of the pass-through effect is not mentioned. This omission is also in the early studies, including 
Catherine Mann, ‘Prices, Profits, Margins and Exchange Rates’, Federal Reserve Bullefin, Wash- 
ington, June 1986, pp. 366-79, and Krugman, Exchange Rare Insrabiliry (Cambridge, Massa- 
chusetts: MIT Press, 1989). 
14. This hypothesis is discussed at length in Bhagwati, ‘The Pass-through Puzzle: the Missing 
Prince from Hamlet’, mimeograph, Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York, 
December 1988. The paper was summarized in an Economics Focus column, ‘Passing the Buck’, 
The Economist, London, I 1  February 1989, p. 63.  
15. In particular, the experience of the automobile industry bears out this hypothesis. See 
Kiyohiko Shibayama, Michiko Kiji, Toshihiro Horiuchi and Kazuharu Kiyono, Marker Srrucrure 
andExporf Prices, Discussion Paper No. 88-DF- 1 (Tokyo: Research Institute of International Trade 
and Industry, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1988). The impact of the trigger-price 
mechanism on United States steel imports on the pass-through effect is also borne out. As Dr 
Shibayama communicated to me: ‘On the aggregate level, pass-through ratios for Japanese exports 
have been lower during this post-1985 period than during the 1977-78 period of the high yen. More 
than half of this decline may be attributed to a decrease in the pass-through ratios for Japanese steel 
and automobiles, two of our country’s principal exports.’ (Letter dated 14 February 1989.) 
16. For careful analysis of this question, see W.M. Corden, ‘Trade Policy and Macroeconomic 
Balance in the World Economy’, forthcoming in Charles Pearson and James Riedel (eds), Essays in 
Honor of Isaiah Frank (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1990). Also see Richard H. Clarida, ‘That 
Trade Deficit, Protectionism and Policy Coordination’, in this number of The World Economy. 
17. Some economic studies show that United States protection will improve the trade deficit. But 
these results come from assumptions - for instance, that the revenues from the tariffs are saved. The 
implied notion that the United States has become sufficiently under-developed to need revenues from 
tariffs, as many poor countries used to do, would be amusing if it  were not so damaging to sensible 
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policy-making. See Rudiger Dornbusch, ‘External Balance Correction: Depreciation or Protec- 
tion?’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Washington, No. I ,  1987, pp. 249-69. 
18. See Bhagwati, Protectionism, op. cit. 
19. Cf. Bhagwati, ‘A Giant among Liliputians: Japan’s Long-run Trade Problem’, in Ryuzo Sato 
and Julianne Nelson (eds), Beyond Trade Friction: Japan-United States Economic Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
20. Sol Chaikin, ‘Trade, Investment and Deindustrialization: Myth and Reality’, Foreign Affairs, 
New York, Spring 1982, p. 848. Other telling examples are quoted in Bhagwati, Protectionism, op. 
cit., pp. 99-101. 
21. The foremost members of the de-industrialization school in the United States are Stephen 
Cohen and John Zysman, Manufacturing Matters: the Myth of the Post-industrial Economy (New 
York: Basic Books, 1987). While the British school has virtually become defunct, after an initial 
splash and having had a temporary impact on British legislation in the form of a Selective 
Employment Tax designed to create differential incentives for employment in manufacturing at the 
expense of services (see Bhagwati, Protectionism, op. cit . ,  ch. 5 ) ,  the American school has recently 
gained a few academic converts. 
Whether and how soon the American school will atrophy like the British school should depend on 
the different interactions between the manufacturing sector and academics in the two countries. 
While the Labour Party and generally left-wing British economists who led the de-industrialization 
school had little to do with the manufacturing corporations who would profit from a pro- 
manufacturing policy, this is not so for the academic converts to the de-industrialization school 
among the new Democrats in the United States. This contrast offers an interesting subject for 
analysis. 
22. Cf. Dornbusch, James Poterba and Lawrence Summers, 77ze Case for Manufacturing in 
America’s Future (Rochester: Eastman Kodak Company, 1988). Since there is yet another Kodak 
study by Professor Dornbusch, but now with Paul Krugman and Yung Chul Park, Meeting World 
Challenges: United States Manufacturing in the 1990s (1989), 1 refer to these hereafter as Kodak I 
and Kodak 11. 
23. I return later to the question whether there ure such externalities to manufactures. 
24. Cf. Kodak I ,  op. cit . ,  p. 10. 
25. Cohen and Zysman, op. cit . ,  p. 16. 
26. Bhagwati, Protectionism, op. cit., p. 114. 
27. Cf. Kodak I ,  op. cir., p. 10. 
28. See the extended analysis and introduction of these concepts in Bhagwati, ‘Splintering and 
Disembodiment of Services and Developing Nations’, The World Economy, June 1984. pp. 133-43. 
Their implications for the Uruguay Round negotiations are considered in Bhagwati, ‘Trade in 
Services and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations’, World Bank Economic Review, Washington, 
No. 4, 1987, pp. 549-69. An excellent analysis of the conceptual issues is also contained in Gary 
Sampson and Richard Snape, ‘Identifying the Issues in Trade in Services’, 77ze World Economy, June 
29. Pioneered originally by James Brander and Barbara Spencer, the theory has been elegantly 
developed by Avinash Dixit, Gene Grossman and Jonathan Eaton, among others. Such intervention 
is called ‘strategic’ because it involves taking the reactions of oligopolistic foreign firms to one’s 
decisions into account. The ‘large-group’ case, distinct from the small-group oligopoly case, has 
also been developed as part of the general interest in market structure and was pioneered by Kelvin 
Lancaster, Professor Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz, Elhanan Helpman and Paul Kmgman. The earliest 
formal treatments of market structure in international trade began with consideration of pure 
monopoly: with my analysis of the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas in the presence of monopoly 
and with Peter Svedberg and Homi Katrak analyzing the optimal policy for a country faced with a 
monopolistic supplier. Cf. Bhagwati, ‘On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas’, in Robert E. 
Baldwin et al .  (eds), Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth: Essays in Honor of Gotrfn’ed 
Haberler (Amsterdam North-Holland, 1965), and Peter Svedberg. ‘Optimal Tariff Policy on 
Imports from Multinat onals’, Economic Record, Melbourne, March 1979, pp. 64-67. 
1985, pp. 171-82. 
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30. This is the conclusion of Lawrence Katz and Summers, ‘Industry Rents: Evidence and 
Implications’, Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, No. 2, 1989, pp. 209-75. The paper looks at 
evidence for 74 manufacturing industries in the United States for 1984. 
31. See Ricardo J. Caballero and Richard Lyons, ‘The Role of External Economies in United 
States Manufacturing’, mimeograph, Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York, 
April 1989, and Infernal versus External Economies in European Industry, Columbia Discussion 
Paper No. 426 (New York: Columbia University, 1989). The European countries covered are the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Belgium and the United Kingdom. A similar conclusion is 
drawn by Dale Jorgenson. Frank Gollop and Barbara Fraumeni. Producriviry and United States 
Economic Growrh (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987) p .  2 10. 
32. This dilemma, where one believes a phenomenon is important but cannot plausibly substan- 
tiate it with evidence, recurs often in economics as in other social sciences. Roy Harrod, in his 
biography of Keynes, recalls how he worked with Lord Cherwell, Prime Minister Churchill’s 
adviser, during the War but resigned and returned to Oxford. He could not tolerate a situation where 
the physicist wanted to know the dimensions of anything that Harrod would argue to be important. 
Harrod, like most of us, felt strongly that something was significant, but had no way of measuring 
and proving it to be so. 
33. In my view, the belief that these industries have critical economic externalities, as also the 
‘non-economic’ desire to have a ‘modern’ economy, is what drives politicians to battles designed to 
get an appropriate share of these industries. The weapons used are whatever come to hand. 
including charges of ‘unfair trade’ practices by successful rivals and an occasional invoking of 
‘strategic’ trade policy. 
34. Cf. Caballero and Lyons, op. cit. 
35. Adding the total economy as another explanatory variable for output did not improve the 
explanation over what total manufacturing did. But that suggests that total size of the economy might 
have worked as well as the size of the manufacturing sector as an explanatory variable signifying 
externalities. 
36. Ofcourse, the theory of non-economic objectives and policy intervention, as developed in the 
1960s by W.M. Corden, Harry G. Johnson, Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan, Adolf Vandendorpe 
and others, shows that the optimal subsidy, in case of learning related to manufacturing output, 
would be to production, not to employment. 
37. See, in particular, Robert Rowthorn. ’What Remains of Kaldor’s Law?’, Economic Journul, 
Cambridge, March 1975, pp. 10-19; Nicholas Kaldor, ‘Economic Growth and the Verdoorn Law 
- a Comment on Mr Rowthorn’s Article’, Economic Journd, December 1975, pp. 891-96; 
Rowthorn, ‘A  Reply to Lord Kaldor’s Comment’, Economic Journal, December 1975, 
pp. 897-901; and Rowthorn, ‘A Note on Verdoorn’s Law’, Economic Journd, March 1979, 
The empirical evidence on ‘learning by doing’ is summarized and extended in Marvin Lieberman, 
‘The Learning Curve and Pricing in the Chemical Processing Industries’, Rand Journd of 
Economics, Santa Monica, California, No. 2, 1984, pp. 213-28. This article, which is the most 
careful to date, is however based on price rather than cost data and, more important. does not 
distinguish between learning by doing related to the output of the firm (which should not produce 
any market failure unless it is so large relative to market expansion as to make perfect competition 
unsustainable) and learning by doing related to industry output which it measures (and which may 
include what I have called ‘learning by others’ doing’ which constitutes an externality leading to 
market failure in the absence of appropriability). 
On the other hand, there is some systematic evidence from the analysis of patent data in the United 
States that R&D spill-overs exist across firms, in different industries but in technological space 
defining ‘technological neighbours’, and that they will result in higher profits to the beneficiaries of 
such spill-overs, indicating lack of full appropriability . See Adam Jaffee, ‘Technological Oppor- 
tunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms’ Patents, Profits, and Market Value’, American 
Economic Review, No. 5 ,  1986, pp. 984-1001. If market failure obtains, with mutual lack of 
appropriability being unequal among competitive firms undertaking R&D, there would be a case for 
subsidizing R&D by the firms that lose on balance from the lack of full appropriability. 
pp. 131-33. 
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38. This argument has been made by Lawrence Summers 
39. This revival is due to Lawrence Summers who, in papers with Katz, op. cit . ,  and Alan 
Krueger, ‘Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure’, mimeograph, Department of 
Economics, Harvard University, February 1986, has developed this argument empirically with 
tenacity and ingenuity. 
40. Originating with Mihail Manolesco, the argument was developed in a classic paper by Everett 
Hagen, ‘An Economic Justification of Protectionism’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, November 1958, pp. 496-514. It was then generalized to the theory of domestic 
distortions and welfare by Bhagwati and V.K. Ramaswami, ‘Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the 
Theory of Optimum Subsidy’, Journal of Political Economy, Chicago, No. 1 ,  1963, pp. 44-50. 
culminating in the post-war theory of commercial policy, 
41. Quoted from Krugman, ‘Is Free Trade Passe?’, Journal ofEconomic Perspectives, Princeton, 
No. I ,  1987, pp. 131-44. These claims are regrettably without foundation in ignoring the numerous 
arguments for appropriate trade and domestic interventions that were developed in the post-war 
theory of commercial policy. They are also dangerous in suggesting to the protectionists that all 
earlier theoretical arguments were falsely premised: this encourages the populist and Congressional 
dismissal of the scientific corpus of thought on commercial policy which the new work by no means 
supplants but only adds to. See Rhagwati, ‘Is Free Trade Passe After All?’, Bernhard Harms Prize 
Speech, Weltwirtschnjiliches Archiv, Kiel, No. 1 .  1989. pp. 3-30. 
42. See David G .  Tarr, A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Werfare and Employment Effects of 
United Stares Quotas in Textiles, Autos and Steel, Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal 
Trade Commission (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1989) ch. 8, pp. 6 and 7. 
43. Richard Brecher, ‘An Efficiency-wage Model of Unemployment in an Open Economy’, 
mimeograph, Department of Economics, Carleton University, Ottawa, March 1989, has examined 
trade policy when shirking obtains in an otherwise conventional general-equilibrium model. 
Professor Brecher’s theoretical analysis correctly emphasizes that shirking will lead both to higher 
wage rates to make the penalty of job loss greater if caught and to monitoring costs as well. The 
higher wage differential is therefore only one consequence; the empirical work must simultaneously 
look for monitoring costs (which would not show up in this way) if the shirking inference is to be 
made. 
44. Cf. Krueger and Summers, op. cit. 
45. Katz and Summers, op. cit., p. 226. 
46. See, for detailed analysis, Bhagwati and Dougas A. Irwin, ‘The Return of the Reciproci- 
47. Staffan Burenstam Linder, The Pacijc Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986). 
48. In some instances, contempt has yielded to fear. Who cannot recall President de Gaulle’s 
disdainful remark about the Japanese Prime Minister: ‘Who is this transistor salesman?’ The 
European Community’s frenetic use of anti-dumping actions to hold Japanese imports down suggests 
an altogether changed attitude to the subject matter, as splendidly documented by Brian Hindley, 
‘Dumping and the Far East Trade of the European Community’, The World Economy, December 
1988, and Patrick Messerlin, ‘The EC Anti-dumping Regulations: a First Economic Appraisal, 
1980-85’, WeltwirtschaJ?/iches Archiv, No. 3 ,  1989, and ‘GATT-inconsistent Outcomes of GATT- 
consistent Laws: the Long-term Evolution of the EC Anti-dumping Law’, paper for the Trade Policy 
Research Centre as part of its programme of studies on Regulatory Trade Measures and the Concept 
of Unfair Trade. 
49. There are other parallels and contrasts, too, which are analyzed in Bhagwati and Irwin, op. 
cit. 
50. The growth of the export interests in the United States has been noted and analyzed in three 
independent contributions: Bhagwati, Protectionism. op. cir. ; Helen Milner, Resisting Protec- 
tionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1988); and 1.M. Destler and John Odell, The Politics ofAnti-protection (Washington: Institute 
for International Economics, 1987). While all authors consider the benign role of these interests in 
shifting trade policy away from import protectionism to exports and ‘openiiig markets’, the first 
tarians: US Trade Policy Today’, The World Economy, June 1987, pp. 109-30. 
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considers also the down side of the phenomenon - that these export interests may capture trade 
policy to foster ‘export protectionism’, as discussed below. 
5 1. For early analyses, see Georgio Basevi, ‘Domestic Demand and Ability to Export’, Journalof 
Political Economy, No. 2, 1970, pp. 330-40, and, in particular, Richard Pomfret, ‘Some Inter- 
relationships Between Import Substitution and Export Promotion in a Small Open Economy’, 
Weltwirtschajiliches Archiv. No. 4, 1975. pp. 714-27. 
52. The permanent advantage results only in the classroom model. In the real world, countless 
factors are altering the relative fortunes of firms over time, of course. To go from this classroom 
demonstration of permanent and irreversible advantage to a policy prescription of protection is 
therefore to make a leap that is not sensible. 
53, The scale argument was beautifully formalized in the Brander-Spencer framework by 
Krugman, ‘Import Protection as Export Promotion’, in Henryk Kierzkowski (ed.), Monopolistic 
Competition and International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
54. See, in particular, Krugman (ed.), Strategic Trade Policy and the New International 
Economics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1986). 
55. History has few recorded cases of unilateral free traders or unilateral trade liberalizations. 
More common are unilateral trade liberalizations imposed on developing countries as part of 
conditionality packages attached to IMF and World Bank assistance. 
56. Again, there are classroom exceptions leading to paradoxical outcomes. 
57. The bargaining of trade concessions has the well-known downside effect that it may induce 
countries that want to liberalize unilaterally to ‘hold back’ until they can bargain the trade 
liberalization instead of ‘throwing the chips away’. Also. it may induce countries to impose tariffs in 
order to acquire chips. 
58. Thus Japan could be asked to reduce her trade barriers, because of the latter arguments, even 
if she did not have a big surplus. 
59. There are numerous ways in which one‘s trade regime can affect investment and savings, in 
principle. Empirical analysis of many countries’ trade and payments policies also suggests many 
such possibilities, but it also shows that these effects can go in several different directions. Cf. 
Bhagwati, The Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes (Cambridge, Massa- 
chusetts: Ballinger, for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978) ch. 6, which reviews the 
theoretical and empirical findings on the relationship of trade policy to domestic savings. Also see 
Clarida, op. cit., for other theoretical arguments. And also recall Note 16. 
60. The ‘scarce-currency’ clause at the IMF is a useful precedent of sorts in this regard. 
61. These are by Edward Learner and Gary Saxonhouse. See T.N. Srinivasan and Koichi 
Hamada, ‘The United States-Japan Problem’, paper presented to the Conference on United States 
Trade Policy, Columbia University, New York, 8 September 1989. Surprisingly, the report of the 
Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations, mentioned at the start, ignores these studies and 
concentrates instead on the findings of Robert Lawrence, of the Brookings Institution. which are 
favourable to their recommendations for managed trade with Japan. 
62. Of course, economists familiar with ethics allow for meta-preferences - that is, preferences 
about preferences. If you are a racist, I certainly will not take a ‘value-free’ position, allowing you 
free play. But to imagine that the Japanese housewife’s preference for Japanese goods falls into this 
class of meta-preferences is to invite ridicule. 
Again, if one recognizes that tastes can be partly endogenous due to advertising and other forms of 
diffusion of information, one might argue that Japanese housewives have less access to information 
about foreign goods than the American housewife. But this would be implausible indeed for post-war 
Japan and for a period when American cultural hegemony has been a source of worldwide concern. 
63. Newsweek, New York, 13 February 1989, p. 50. 
64. Mordechai E. Kreinin, ‘How Closed is Japan’s Market? Additional Evidence’, The World 
Economy, December 1988, pp. 529-42. 
65. The closest that anyone came to trying to do this was the German Government in regard to 
aid-tying. When the United States and the United Kingdom imposed source-tying restrictions on 
their aid, during their payments-deficit years, the German Finance Ministry tried to avoid similar 
aid-tying because of the German surplus. In the end, however, it could not because German 
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exporters were outraged by the fact that this meant that they were unable to tender for American-aid- 
financed contracts while American exporters could tender for German-aid-financed contracts. See 
the discussion in Bhagwati, ‘The Tying of Aid’, study prepared for UNCTAD. reprinted in 
Bhagwati, Dependence and Interdependence: Essays in Development Economics, Vol. 2. edited by 
Gene Grossman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1985; and Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1985). 
66. See, for instance, Paul Blustein. ‘Finding a Retirement Home for Japan’s “Papa-Mama” 
Stores’, The Washingfon Post National Weekly, 21-27 August 1989, p. 19. There is disagreement, 
however, over how restrictive really is the Japanese retail distribution system. See The Economist, 
26 August 1989. 
67. For example, some countries, and economists, believe that retail price maintenance is a good 
thing (because, for instance, consumers do not have to shop around). For foreign firms used to the 
‘orderly’ distribution system that also attends such retail price maintenance, the American distribu- 
tion system may appear too chaotic and difficult to adapt to. Again, within the European Community, 
the retail distribution systems of member countries exhibit substantial variations, reflecting different 
cultural, historical and economic factors. 
68. Edmund Dell, ‘Of Free Trade and Reciprocity’. The World Economy, June 1986, p. 134. 
69. Ironically, the original 1955 waiver granted to agriculture by the GATT was to the United 
States. Equally, the question of trade in services was first raised internationally at UNCTAD rather 
than at the GATT. How the world changes! 
70. On these questions, see the splendid analysis by Martin Wolf, ‘Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment of Developing Countries and the International Trading System’, and also 
Shailendra Anjaria, ‘Balance of Payments and Related Issues in the Uruguay Round of Trade 
Negotiations’, World Bank Economic Review, September 1987. This issue contains a Symposium on 
‘The MTN and Developing Country Interests’. 
Also see the excellent articles by Isaiah Frank, ‘Import Quotas, the Balance of Payments and the 
GATT’, The World Economy, September 1987, pp. 307-18, and Richard Eglin, ‘Surveillance of 
Balance-of-payments Measures in the GATT’, The World Economy, March 1987, pp. 1-26. 
71. A review of 40 measures by the United States that impede the European Community’s exports 
was released, for instance, in May 1989. See EC News. Washington, No. 13/89, May 1989. The 
IBRD-UNCTAD index of non-tariff barriers also suggests the same conclusion, although the index 
has well-known conceptual problems. 
72. James Fallows, ‘Containing Japan’, Atlanric Monthly, May 1989. In his earlier book, More 
Like Us (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), Mr Fallows takes the position that the American 
response to the Japanese challenge should be to improve and strengthen its own institutions along 
lines more consonant with its flexible and open traditions. 
73. This argument has been made by Isaiah Frank. 
74. See the report in South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, 21 February 1989, p. 1. In 
particular: ‘There was clear evidence of threats of retaliation by American law firms that Hong Kong 
would suffer trade restrictions unless the Government allowed foreign lawyers entry. ’ 
75. The concept of VIEs where the importing countries are asked to increase imports of specific 
items from particular countries by given amounts is the counterpart of the familiar concept of VERs 
(‘voluntary’ export restrictions) where exports by these countries are restrained thus. The concept 
and terminology of VIEs were introduced in Bhagwati, ‘VERs, Quid Pro Quo DFI and VIEs: 
Political-Economy-Theoretic Analyses’, Internarional Economic Journal, Seoul, Spring 1987, 
pp. 1-12, and are further discussed in Bhagwati. Protectionism, op. cit., pp. 82-84. 
76. The fact that, thanks to economists’ efforts at education, the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative now is explicit in saying that it will call for non-discriminatory trade concessions 
under Section-301 and Super-301 procedures does not invalidate the argument in the text as to why 
Section 301 came to acquire its appeal at the outset. Nor does it assuage the worry that, despite the 
USTR’s present policy, the Section-301 and Super-301 actions will not anyway result in VIEs and 
trade diversion rather than in trade creation, as discussed later. 
77. TRIMS and TRIPS are both acronyms happily suggesting good health and gratification to the 
harried negotiators in the Uruguay Round talks. 
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78. The Jenkins Bill on textiles was defeated. But the launching of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations did not work to stop the passage of the 1988 Trade Act. 
79. For a story on how South Korea planned to do precisely this with her agricultural imports, see 
Financia[ Times, 27 April 1987. Also see Bhagwati, Protectionism, op. cit., pp. 82-84. for analysis 
of the issue, and the recent story in Fortune (27 February 1989, pp. 88-89, story by Rahul Jacob) 
recording these concerns as well. 
80. This was demonstrated in John H. Jackson, ‘The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 
the United States Domestic Law’, Michigan Lrrw Review, Ann Arbor. December 1967, 
81. For an illuminating analysis of Section-301 provisions along these lines, see Robert E. 
Hudec, ‘Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil’, mimeograph, School of 
Law, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 15 June 1989. 
82. Claude Barfield Jr has remarked that the Presidential discretion not to take action was built in 
by the Reagan Administration as a necessary precaution, with the Administration understanding that 
it would indeed be exercised. On the other hand, the Congressional activists pushing Super 301 
believed that Presidential discretion would not be allowed to come in the way of Super-301 actions. 
The change of Administration, and the greater willingness of President Bush to work in harmony 
with the Congress, seems to have tilted the balance in favour of the latter presumption, favouring 
Super-301 actions. 
83. Bhagwati, ‘Super 301’s Big Bite Flouts the Rules’, New York Times, 4 June 1989, and 
pp. 249-332. 
‘Taking the Teeth outof Super 301;. World Link, World Economic Forum, July-August 1989, No. 
718. D. 7. 
84. The fact that Super 301 is an altogether inappropriate instrument for trade liberalization does 
not mean that the United States or, for that matter, any significant country in world trade should not 
exercise pressure in appropriate ways for liberalizing trade. The USTR practice of compiling 
estimates of trade barriers facing the United States, and the European Community’s response 
thereto, is most welcome. So are the annual trade policy reviews of specific countries, starting this 
year at the GATT. The notion that those opposed to America’s unilateral one-on-one tactics are for 
laissez faire towards foreign trade barriers is based on a non sequirur. 
85. See Analysis of the United States-Japan Trade Problem, Report of the Advisory Committee 
on Trade Negotiations (Washington: USTR, 1989). 
86. This is documented by Robert Z. Lawrence, ‘Imports in Japan: Closed Markets or Closed 
Minds?’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 2, 1987, pp. 523-24. Also see the forceful 
argumentation in the response to the ACTN Report by the Japan-US Business Council, ‘Can a 
“Results-oriented’’ Trade Strategy Work?’, 26th Conference, San Francisco, 30 June 1989. 
87. Even for the more homogeneous case of semi-conductors, the accusations against the 
Japanese are not overwhelmingly persuasive. 
88. For example, how is the target to be set, how is it to be achieved by Japan which is not a 
centrally-planned economy, how are penalizing tariffs invoked at high levels against Japan (for 
failure to meet the target increases in imports) to be reconciled with the GATT and what would be 
the reaction of Japan finally to such ham-fisted and authoritarian indulgence of Japan-bashing? None 
of these considerations has crossed the mind of Rudiger Dornbusch (New York Times, Sunday 
Business, 24 September 1989) who has recently proposed this form of managed trade. See the 
devastating critique offered by the economics columnist, Hobart Rowen, in the Washington Post, 24 
September 1989. 
89. Clyde Prestowitz has even argued that Japan’s cultural differences, and the resulting 
impenetrability of the Japanese market, make Japan surplus-prone (Newsweek, Japan, 1 June 1989). 
In response (Newsweek, Japan, ibid., and Wall Street Journal, 28 July 1989), I have noted that, in 
that case, it is astonishing that it took so long since Commodore Perry opened Japan in the nineteenth 
century for this inevitable surplus to emerge. Sarcasm aside, Japan has run deficits over sustained 
periods in this century. Nor can anyone ignore the fact that Japan’s recent surplus has been great at a 
time when Japan’s cultural differences were being reduced rather than increased. The ‘culturalists’ 
who go from culture to surpluses to managed trade need to take a basic course in macro-economics 
and another in economic history. 
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90. See the classic article by Murray Kemp and Henry Wan Jr, ‘An Elementary Proposition 
Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions’ (1976), reprinted in Bhagwati (ed.), International 
Trade: Selected Readings (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 198 1). 
91. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA), formed almost concurrently with the 
European Community, was followed by the formation of the Latin American Free Trade Associa- 
tion, which soon came to grief, and in the last half of the 1960s proposals were made for a Pacific free 
trade area and a North Atlantic one. 
92. The issue of trade diversion is not as flimsy as might be imagined just because there were few 
tariffs between Canada and the United States before the free trade agreement. As David Palmeter has 
shown, the rules of origin have been drastically changed by the free trade agreement to make 
protectionist trade diversion easier through arbitrary misuse of the new rules. Cf. Palmeter, ‘The 
FTA Rules of Origin: Boon or Boondogle?’, paper presented to the Canadian Centre for Trade Law 
and Policy, Ottawa, 5 May 1989. 
93. I reject therefore not merely the economic logic but also the policy wisdom of the Kodak I1 
recommendations to promote regional and bilateral arrangements because preferential access over 
other exporting countries (whether efficient suppliers or not) is one of the ‘benefits’ of such 
arrangements! By contrast, see the excellent essay on the subject by Michael Aho, ‘More Bilateral 
Trade Agreements Would Be a Blunder: What the Next President Should Do’, Cornell International 
Laiv Journal, Ithaca. November 1989. 
94. The key point is the important, anti-rnultilateralist signal conveyed by the American conver- 
sion to regionalism in the shape of Article XXIV. Regional arrangements of one kind or another, in a 
wider sense, have always been around and have generally not aroused similar expectations as has the 
free trade agreement. Thus as J.H.  Jackson, Worid Trade and the Law of G A n  (Charlottesville: 
Michie, 1969). has remarked, ‘It has been pointed out that today [ 19651 more than two thirds of the 
membership of the GATT are nations that belong to one or another regional arrangement’ (p. 588). 
Creative Inertia in Government 
THE following entry for 6 January appeared in the Diaries of James Hacker, 
Minister for Administrative Affairs, relating to his difficulties with Sir Humphrey 
Appleby, Permanent Secretary of his Ministry: 
‘Today, by a lucky chance, I learned a bit about dealing with Sir Humphrey. I 
bumped into Tom Sargent in the House of Commons smoking room. I asked if I 
could join him and he was only too pleased. 
‘“How are you enjoying being in Opposition?” I asked him jocularly. 
‘Like the good politician he is, he didn’t exactly answer my question. “How are 
‘I could see no reason to beat about the bush and I told him that, quite honestly, 
‘ “Humphrey got you under control?” he smiled. 
‘I dodged that one, but said that it’s so very hard to get anything done. He 
nodded, so I asked him, “did you get anything done?” 
“‘Almost nothing,” he replied cheerfully. “But I didn’t cotton on to his 
technique till I’d been there over a year - and then of course there was the 
election. ” 
you enjoying being in government?” he replied. 
I’m not enjoying it as much as I’d expected to. 
480 CREATIVE INERTIA IN GOVERNMENT 
‘It emerged from the conversation that the technique in question was Humph- 
rey’s system for stalling. According to Tom, it’s in five stages. I made a note 
during our conversation for future reference. 
‘Stage One: Humphrey will say that the administration is in its early months and 
there’s an awful lot of other things to get on with. (Tom clearly knows his stuff. 
That is just what Humphrey said to me the day before yesterday.) 
‘Srage Two: If I persist past Stage One, he’ll say that he quite appreciates the 
intention, something certainly ought to be done - but is this the right way to 
achieve it? 
‘Srage Three: If I’m still undeterred he will shift his ground from how I do it to 
when I do it, i.e. “Minister, this is not the time. for all sorts of reasons.” 
‘Srage Four: Lots of Ministers settle for Stage Three according to Tom. But if 
not, he will then say that the policy has run into difficulties - technical, political 
and/or legal. (Legal difficulties are best because they can be made totally 
incomprehensible and can go on for ever.) 
‘Stage Five: Finally, because the four stages have taken up to three years, the 
last stage is to say that “we’re getting rather near to the run up to the next general 
election - so we can’t be sure of getting the policy through.” 
‘The stages can be made to last three years because at each stage Sir Humphrey 
will do absolutely nothing until the Minister chases him. And he assumes, rightly, 
that the Minister has too much else to do.’ 
- Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay, Yes Miriister: the Diuries of u Cuhiriet Miiiisrer b1 the Rt Hon.  
Jutnes Hacker M P .  Volume I (London: British Broadcasting Corporation. 1981) pp. 90-91. 
Lethal Protectionism 
FROM Art Buchwald’s column in the Znternational Herald Tribune, Paris, of 24 
August 1989: 
‘President George Bush made a terrible mistake when he banned the importing 
of foreign semi-automatic guns into the United States. What he did was cut out the 
Italians, Israelis and Chinese to make sure the American people are supplied with 
semi-automatic weapons made in the good old USA. The trouble with this is that 
US manufacturers can’t meet the demand and Americans now have to wait months 
to get the semi-automatic weapons of their dreams. 
‘The New Yurk Times reports that most domestic manufacturers are working 
seven days a week to meet the orders and the demand for the guns is at its peak and 
going higher. I confirmed this when I visited the Sudden Death Gun Company. 
The owner, Orville Bang, was sweating as he poured grease on the weapons that 
came off the production line. Between crates he told me that the semi-automatic 
business has never been better and President Bush was a peach of a guy for keeping 
the foreign competition out of the US market.’ 
